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The Supreme Court’s Anti-Retaliation Principle 
 
Richard Moberly* 
 
 
Abstract 
In five cases issued during the last five years, the Supreme Court interpreted 
statutory anti-retaliation provisions broadly to protect employees who report 
illegal employer conduct. These decisions conflict with the typical understanding 
of this Court as pro-employer and judicially conservative. In a sixth retaliation 
decision during this time, however, the Court interpreted constitutional anti-
retaliation protection narrowly, which fits with the Court’s pro-employer image 
but diverges from the anti-retaliation stance it appeared to take in the other five 
retaliation cases. This Article explains these seemingly anomalous results by 
examining the last fifty years of the Supreme Court’s retaliation jurisprudence. In 
doing so, a persistent theme emerges: the “Anti-Retaliation Principle,” which the 
Court uses to advance the notion that protecting employees from retaliation will 
enhance the enforcement of the nation’s laws. The Court has used the Anti-
Retaliation Principle for a half-century to strengthen statutory protection from 
employer retaliation. However, the Court also has demonstrated consistently that 
it considers the Principle to be primarily a statutory, rather than a constitutional, 
norm. The Anti-Retaliation Principle explains the recent cases and provides a 
reasoned and consistent standard against which they can be evaluated. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s Anti-Retaliation Principle provides important 
lessons for courts as they confront the need to prevent employers from retaliating 
against employees who report illegalities. 
                                                 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law; J.D., magna cum laude, 
1998, Harvard Law School. I appreciate the helpful comments from Steve Willborn and the 
participants at the Southeastern Association of Law Schools who attended a presentation of this 
paper. Susan Schneider provided excellent research assistance. A McCollum Research Grant 
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Introduction 
In each of five recent cases involving statutory retaliation claims by 
employees, the Supreme Court upheld the employee’s claim and 
expanded protection from employer retaliation.1 A sixth employment 
retaliation case in 2006 involved a First Amendment claim with a 
dramatically different result. In Garcetti v. Ceballos,2 the Court found in 
favor of the employer and severely restricted constitutional anti-
retaliation protection.3  
Together these cases present a confusing and seemingly contradictory 
view of the Court’s retaliation jurisprudence. On the one hand, the Court’s 
holdings in the five statutory cases could indicate that the Court favors 
employees in retaliation cases—a conclusion that would strike many 
commentators as odd given the Court’s decidedly mixed record of 
protecting employee rights in the past decade.4 On the other hand, the 
                                                 
1 See Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846, 852-53 
(2009) (interpreting Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3); CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 
128 S. Ct. 1951, 1961 (2008) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 128 
S. Ct. 1931, 1943 (2008) (interpreting 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a)); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 
548 U.S. 53, 56-57 (2006) (interpreting Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3); Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of 
Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 171 (2005) (interpreting 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)). 
2 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
3 See id. at 426 (finding that the First Amendment did not protect government employees who 
speak about matters of public concern if the employee speech was part of the employee’s job 
duties). 
4 See, e.g., Melissa Hart, Procedural Extremism: The Supreme Court’s 2008-2009 Labor and 
Employment Cases, 13 EMP. R. & EMP. POL’Y J. 253, 288-89 (2009) (noting that the Roberts Court has 
issued several decisions that undercut an employee’s ability to bring employment claims in federal 
court); Scott Moss, Fighting Discrimination While Fighting Litigation: A Tale of Two Supreme Courts, 76 
FORDHAM L. REV. 981, 983 (2007) (“In employment discrimination, it is as if there are two Supreme 
Courts issuing conflicting rulings.”); Anita Silvers, et al., Disability and Employment Discrimination at 
the Rehnquist Court, 75 MISS. L.J. 945, 946 (2006) (noting “[the] Court's general pattern of favoring 
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Court’s Garcetti opinion significantly narrowed government employees’ 
protection when they blow the whistle on employer misconduct,5 perhaps 
indicating a deeper resistance to retaliation protection. Moreover, as 
explained in more detail below, taken together the Court opinions appear 
untethered to any consistent judicial philosophy, which has created 
difficulty for commentators trying to explain the Court’s twists and turns.6 
This Article attempts to bring consistency and cohesion to this morass 
by placing these recent retaliation cases in the context of a half-century of 
Supreme Court retaliation jurisprudence. This process illuminates the 
Court’s underlying rationale in retaliation cases generally, which I label 
the “Anti-Retaliation Principle.” The Anti-Retaliation Principle differs 
from other justifications for retaliation protection because it focuses on the 
notion that protecting employees from retaliation will enhance the 
enforcement of the nation’s laws.7 Moreover, it both explains the recent 
Supreme Court cases and provides a reasoned and consistent standard 
against which they can be evaluated. Importantly, the Court’s use of the 
Principle also offers guidance for the way courts ought to approach the 
issue of employer retaliation in the future. 
Part I of the Article demonstrates that the Supreme Court historically 
has approached retaliation cases differently than typical employment 
matters. In employment cases, the Court often balances the employer’s 
                                                                                                                                     
plaintiffs in race and sex... discrimination cases, while being decidedly pro-defendant in ... 
disability-related claims”); Jonathan R. Harkavy, Supreme Court of the United States: Employment Law 
Commentary: 2007 Term, at 2 (noting that although employees “won” more cases than they lost in 
2007, there was no “discernable shift in the Court’s orientation as an employer-friendly forum”) 
(manuscript on file with author); Marcia Coyle, Term’s Five Key Bias Decisions Were Mixed, NAT’L L.J. 
(July 6, 2009), available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202431973694& 
Terms_five_key_bias_decisions_were_mixed_&slreturn=1 (quoting Professor Paul Secunda’s 
statement that “[t]his Court tilts substantially towards pro-employer interests”). As Professor Scott 
Moss has noted, even though the Court has issued some rulings protecting employees in 
discrimination cases, the Court’s “anti-litigation” policies “significantly harm” the Court’s 
commitment to fighting discrimination. See Moss, supra, at 986; see also Harkavy, supra, at 37 (“[T}he 
unspoken, yet unmistakably apparent, agenda of the new majority is enhancement of employer 
prerogatives, recently focusing on protection of the at-will doctrine.”). 
5 See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 426. 
6 See discussion infra Part II.C. 
7 Commentators have provided numerous other rationales for anti-retaliation protection. See, 
e.g., Lawrence E. Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise 
of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1405, 1434-35 (1967) (arguing that courts should adopt a 
tort of “abusive discharge” based on a fairness principle that employees are economically 
dependent on employers); Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 21-22 (2005) (asserting 
that retaliation protection is another form of statutory prohibition on discrimination); Richard R. 
Carlson, Citizen Employees, 70 LA. L. REV. 237, 245-46 (2009) (arguing that retaliation protection 
should be provided to “citizen employees” who act in the public interest); Stewart J. Schwab, 
Wrongful Discharge Law and the Search for Third-Party Effects, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1943, 1945 (asserting that 
“the search for third-party effects is the driving force behind” the tort of wrongful discharge); 
Robert G. Vaughn, How Differing Perceptions of Whistleblower Protection Influence the Character of Legal 
Standards, at 1 available at www.corrupcion.unam.mx/documentos/ponencias/C_Vaughn.pdf 
(describing four separate justifications for protecting whistleblowers). 
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interests against the employee’s interests.8 In retaliation cases, however, 
the Supreme Court uses the Anti-Retaliation Principle to also consider 
society’s interest in effective enforcement of the laws—an interest the 
Court believes can be advanced through strong anti-retaliation protection 
for employees.9 For the past fifty years, the Court has applied this 
Principle consistently in statutory retaliation cases, but taken a slightly 
more cautious approach in First Amendment cases.  
Prior to this Article, the Supreme Court’s extensive case law regarding 
retaliation has never been examined through the organizing lens of the 
Anti-Retaliation Principle. Rather, commentators often examine these 
cases in isolation, through principles developed for the specific statute or 
constitutional provision under which the retaliation claim arose. For 
example, commentators examine retaliation cases as involving discrete 
subject matters such as discrimination,10 the First Amendment,11 or 
preemption.12 This first part of the Article steps back from the “trees” of 
individual substantive issues and explains the “forest” of retaliation cases. 
Part II examines how the Court relied upon the Anti-Retaliation 
Principle, both explicitly and implicitly, in the six recent retaliation cases. 
Ultimately, the Principle explains the Court’s current retaliation 
jurisprudence and provides a principled way to evaluate the Court’s 
decisions: do these decisions advance the Court’s own Anti-Retaliation 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2152 (2008) (noting 
that a “main principle” in the Court’s public employment cases is that “although government 
employees do not lose their constitutional rights when they accept their positions, those rights 
must be balanced against the realities of the employment context”); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 
524 U.S. 775, 793-808 (1998) (balancing various employer and employee interests in creating 
vicarious liability rule for supervisors under Title VII but also providing for employer affirmative 
defense); UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 206-208 (1991) (narrowly interpreting Title VII’s 
bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense based on balancing employee’s rights against 
employer’s business needs and rejecting test that also considered interests of a pregnant woman’s 
unborn child); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 182 n.4 (1989) (noting the “delicate 
balance between employee and employer rights struck by Title VII”); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 
490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989) (discussing Title VII’s “balance between employee rights and employer 
prerogatives”); O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 719-20 (1987) (“In the case of searches conducted 
by a public employer, we must balance the invasion of the employees' legitimate expectations of 
privacy against the government's need for supervision, control, and the efficient operation of the 
workplace.”); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 797-98 (1945) (approving an 
administrative board’s balance “between the undisputed right of self-organization assured to 
employees under the Wagner Act and the equally undisputed right of employers to maintain 
discipline in their establishments”). Cf. Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) 
(balancing reasonable accommodation of an employee’s disability against any undue hardship to 
the employer). 
9 See discussion infra Part I. 
10 See, e.g., Brake, supra note 7, at 21-22 (examining retaliation as a part of discrimination law). 
11 See, e.g., Paul M. Secunda, Whither the Pickering Rights of Federal Employees?, 79 COLO. L. REV. 
1101, 1102-07 (2008) (examining First Amendment protection for federal employees). 
12 See, e.g., Geri J. Yonover, Preemption of State Tort Remedies for Wrongful Discharge in the 
Aftermath of Lingle v. Norge: Wholly Independent or Inextricably Intertwined?, 34 S. D. L. REV. 63, 89-98 
(1989) (examining Supreme Court’s analysis of federal preemption of state wrongful discharge 
claims under the Labor Management Relations Act). 
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Principle by enhancing the enforcement of law? As this Part explains, in 
the recent statutory cases the Court furthered the Anti-Retaliation 
Principle by privileging the Principle over other norms that may have 
seemed sacrosanct to this Court. By contrast, although the lone 
constitutional case explicitly references the Anti-Retaliation Principle, the 
rule adopted by the Court in Garcetti likely will undermine society’s 
interest in law enforcement. 
Identifying and explaining the Court’s reliance on the Anti-Retaliation 
Principle has significant ramifications for the future of retaliation law, 
which I discuss in Part III. First, the Supreme Court granted certiorari for 
the 2010-11 Term in two cases that will test the boundaries of the Anti-
Retaliation Principle. In Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastic Corp.,13 
the Court will examine whether the Fair Labor Standards Act’s anti-
retaliation provision protects employees who file oral as well as written 
complaints.14 Furthermore, Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP15 
presents the issue whether Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision prohibits 
an employer from retaliating against a third-party who is associated with 
an employee who engaged in protected conduct.16 The Court could use 
the Anti-Retaliation Principle to broaden anti-retaliation protections under 
these statutes, despite arguments that the statutory language at issue in 
each case seemingly excludes the employees’ claims.17 
Second, respecting the Court’s view of the Anti-Retaliation Principle 
should cause lower courts to evaluate retaliation cases through this same 
lens. This perspective might impact a number of retaliation issues 
currently percolating. For example, courts have been struggling with the 
level of causation required by various retaliation statutes,18 and the Anti-
Retaliation Principle can help provide some guidance on this complicated 
issue.19 Further, a focus on law enforcement would help courts interpret 
when a whistleblowing employee has a “reasonable belief” that an 
employer has violated the law, an issue that lower courts often have used 
to undermine statutory protection from retaliation.20 
                                                 
13 130 S. Ct. 1890, No. 09-834 (March 22, 2010) (granting petition for writ of certiorari). 
14 See Pet. for Writ of Certiorari at i, Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastic Corp., No. 09-
834, 2010 WL 146471 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2010). 
15 130 S. Ct. 3542, No. 09-291 (June 29, 2010) (granting petition for writ of certiorari). 
16 See Pet. for Writ of Certiorari at i, Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, No. 09-291, 2009 WL 
2876195 (U.S. Sept. 3, 2009). 
17 See discussion infra Part III.A. 
18 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
19 A recent non-retaliation Supreme Court case, Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 
2343 (2009), which dealt with the appropriate level of causation under the discrimination provision 
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, will enhance this struggle. See id. at 2350. 
20 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
THE SUPREME COURT’S ANTI-RETALIATION PRINCIPLE 
61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. (forthcoming Jan. 2011) 
 
 6 
I.  The Past: The Supreme Court’s Anti-Retaliation Principle 
During the last fifty years of its retaliation jurisprudence, the Supreme 
Court has recognized that employees must be protected from retaliation in 
order to further the enforcement of society’s civil and criminal laws. This 
“Anti-Retaliation Principle” allows the Court to examine anti-retaliation 
protection as a law enforcement tool that benefits society, rather than 
simply as extra protection for employees provided at a cost to employers. 
The Court makes three assumptions throughout its opinions to support 
the Principle: (1) employees are in the best position to know about illegal 
conduct by their employer or other employees; (2) employees will report 
this information if the law protects them from employer retaliation; and 
(3) employee reports about misconduct will improve law enforcement.  
Significantly, the Court has applied the Principle in statutory cases 
differently than in First Amendment retaliation cases. In statutory cases, 
the Court broadly interpreted explicit anti-retaliation provisions and 
implied anti-retaliation protections even when no specific provision 
existed. The Court’s First Amendment retaliation jurisprudence, however, 
provides an outer limit of the Principle. Although the Court recognized 
the Anti-Retaliation Principle’s importance in these cases, the Court also 
suggested that statutes, rather than the Constitution, might be the better 
source for anti-retaliation protection. 
A. Statutory Protection 
Professor Clyde Summers once noted that labor law’s purpose always 
has been to address the imbalance in bargaining power between 
employees and employers.21 From this perspective, statutory and judicial 
employment protections exist to protect employees’ “primarily non-
economic interests in fairness, personal dignity, privacy, and physical 
integrity.”22 These legal protections must be balanced against the 
employer’s countervailing interest in the flexibility and efficiency 
provided by the at-will employment rule.23 In non-retaliation labor and 
employment cases, the Supreme Court has recognized this balancing of 
legal protection for employees against the economic burden that 
protection places on employers.24 Particularly in recent years, however, 
                                                 
21 Clyde W. Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the Guard, 67 NEB. L. REV. 7, 
7 (1988). 
22 Id. at 15. 
23 See Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 951-69 (1984) 
(describing the efficiency of the at-will employment rule); Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (balancing reasonable accommodation of an employee’s disability against 
any undue hardship to the employer). 
24 See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 182 n.4 (1989) (noting the “delicate 
balance between employee and employer rights struck by Title VII”); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 
490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989) (discussing Title VII’s “balance between employee rights and employer 
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that balance seems to be weighted towards employer interests in many 
non-retaliation decisions.25 
By contrast, the Court’s use of the Anti-Retaliation Principle in 
statutory retaliation cases typically has led to enhanced employee 
protection compared to other types of employment law cases. In these 
retaliation cases, the Court often utilized the Anti-Retaliation Principle’s 
“law enforcement” perspective to weigh a third interest: the interest of 
society in having the law enforced. As described below, the Court placed 
great weight on this societal interest because, in the Court’s formulation, 
protecting employees from retaliation increases employees’ willingness to 
provide information about illegal activity, which in turn advances societal 
law enforcement goals. 
Several cases that demonstrate the Court’s use of the Anti-Retaliation 
Principle involved statutes without explicit legislative history about the 
purpose of anti-retaliation legislation. This legislative silence often 
required the Supreme Court to explicate this purpose by utilizing the 
Anti-Retaliation Principle to justify a broad reading of a statutory anti-
retaliation provision.26 For example, in the Court’s first modern case 
involving a statutory anti-retaliation provision, Mitchell v. Robert De Mario 
Jewelry, Inc.,27 the Court examined Section 17 of the Fair Labor Standards 
                                                                                                                                     
prerogatives” by eliminating “certain bases for distinguishing among employees while otherwise 
preserving employer’s freedom of choice); see also note 8, supra, (citing cases involving this 
balancing). 
25 See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., ___ U.S. ____, 129 S. Ct. 2351-52 (2009) (requiring high 
burden of proof for plaintiffs regarding causation in ADEA cases); Ricci v. DeStefano, ___ U.S. ___, 
129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664-65 (2009) (limiting ability of employer to consider impact of potential disparate 
impact claim when engaging in affirmative action); Engquist v. Oregon Dep't of Agriculture, 553 
U.S. 591, 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2156-57 (2008) (restricting application of constitutional Equal Protection 
Clause to public employees); Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 638-43 (2007) 
(limiting statute of limitations for discrimination cases). 
26 The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) is the rare exception, and even that legislative 
history is sparse. Congress included an anti-retaliation provision in the NLRA, one of the first 
employment statutes it enacted, to protect employees who “file charge or given testimony” related 
to a violation of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4); see also STEPHEN M. KOHN, CONCEPTS AND 
PROCEDURES IN WHISTLEBLOWER LAW 93 (2001) (“Among the oldest statutes that protect employees 
(and supervisors) who engage in protected conduct, which under some circumstances can be 
classified as whistleblowing, is the National Labor Relations Act.”) (citation omitted). Congress 
adopted this language from an earlier executive order issued under a predecessor statute explicitly 
so that employees would feel free to file charges when an employer violated the NLRA’s 
substantive provisions. See Matthew W. Finkin, Labor Law by Boz-A Theory of Meyers Industries, 
Inc., Sears, Roebuck and Co., and Bird Engineering, 71 IOWA L. REV. 155, 171 (1985); NAT’L LAB. REL. 
BOARD, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, VOL. I, Debate on S. 1958 
in Senate, at 2401 (comments of Sen. Wagner) (noting that without an anti-retaliation provision 
“even though there might be flagrant violations of the provisions of this measure, an employee 
would not be free to file charges”). 
27 361 U.S. 288 (1960). Twenty-three years before Mitchell, the Supreme Court upheld a 
provision of the NLRA that prevents another form of retaliation. In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), the Court found constitutional Section 8 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158, 
which prohibits employers from engaging in “unfair labor practices,” such as interfering with 
employees who exercise their NLRA rights and discriminating against employees to discourage 
union membership. See Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 33-34. 
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Act (FLSA).28 This provision explicitly gave federal courts jurisdiction to 
enjoin violations of the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision, but the case 
presented the question of whether the provision also permitted courts to 
order that an employer pay damages to employees who were retaliated 
against in violation of the Act.29 Although the FLSA seemed to limit 
courts’ powers to only injunctive relief,30 the Supreme Court held that the 
judiciary’s implicit, equitable powers in injunction cases included the 
power “to provide complete relief in the light of statutory purposes,” 
including awarding back pay damages.31 The Court based its holding 
explicitly on the Anti-Retaliation Principle: 
 
[C]ongress chose to rely on information and complaints 
received from employees seeking to vindicate rights claimed 
to have been denied. Plainly, effective enforcement could thus 
only be expected if employees felt free to approach officials with 
their grievances. This end the prohibition of § 15(a)(3) against 
discharges and other discriminatory practices was designed 
to serve. For it needs no argument to show that fear of 
economic retaliation might often operate to induce 
aggrieved employees quietly to accept substandard 
conditions. By the proscription of retaliatory acts set forth in 
§ 15(a)(3), and its enforcement in equity by the Secretary 
pursuant to § 17, Congress sought to foster a climate in which 
compliance with the substantive provisions of the Act would be 
enhanced. 
 
In this context, the significance of reimbursement of lost 
wages becomes apparent. To an employee considering an 
attempt to secure his just wage deserts under the Act, the 
value of such an effort may pale when set against the 
prospect of discharge and the total loss of wages for the 
indeterminate period necessary to seek and obtain 
reinstatement. Resort to statutory remedies might thus often 
take on the character of a calculated risk, with restitution of 
partial deficiencies in wages due for past work perhaps 
obtainable only at the cost of irremediable entire loss of pay 
for an unpredictable period. Faced with such alternatives, 
                                                 
28 29 U.S.C. § 217. 
29 See Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 289. 
30 See 29 U.S.C. § 217 (giving district courts jurisdiction “for cause shown, to restrain violations 
of [the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision]. Provided, That no court shall have jurisdiction, in any 
action brought by the Secretary of Labor to restrain such violations, to order the payment to 
employees of unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation or an additional equal 
amount as liquidated damages in such action”). 
31 Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 292. 
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employees understandably might decide that matters had 
best be left as they are. We cannot read the Act as presenting 
those it sought to protect with what is little more than a 
Hobson's choice. 32 
 
Thus, in Mitchell, the Court broadly interpreted a statutory anti-retaliation 
provision because it recognized that employees needed strong remedies in 
order to encourage them to come forward with information about 
violations of the law. Moreover, the Court asserted that Congress 
specifically intended for employee information to play a role in the 
statute’s enforcement scheme. 
After Mitchell, the Court consistently wove language supporting the 
Anti-Retaliation Principle into its interpretations of statutory anti-
retaliation protections. In NLRB v. Scrivener,33 the first Supreme Court case 
to use the term “retaliatory discharge,”34 the Court found that the 
National Labor Relations Act protected employees who gave sworn 
statements to a National Labor Relations Board field examiner, even 
though the part of the Act’s anti-retaliation provision at issue seemed to 
limit its protections to employees who file formal charges or testify at a 
formal hearing.35 Limiting the statute’s protections to a narrow reading of 
the provision’s text, according to the Court, would undermine the 
Congressional purpose of the Act to encourage “all persons with 
information about [unfair labor] practices to be completely free from 
coercion against reporting them to the Board.”36 Employees need 
“complete freedom” to report in order “to prevent the Board’s channels of 
information from being dried up by employer intimidation of prospective 
complainants and witnesses.”37 Yet again, the Court acknowledged the 
important role of employee information in enforcing the law. 
Scrivener began a series of cases in which the Court found that express 
anti-retaliation statutory provisions should be interpreted broadly in 
order to support the Anti-Retaliation Principle.38 For example, in Brock v. 
Roadway Express, Inc.,39 the Court recognized the importance of employee 
reports to detect illegal safety violations in the transportation industry40 
                                                 
32 Id. at 292-93 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
33 405 U.S. 117 (1972). 
34 See Humprhies v. CBOCS West, Inc., 474 F.3d 387, 408 (2007) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting in 
part) (citing NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117 (1972)). 
35 See Scrivener, 405 U.S. at 125. The Court interpreted Section 8(a)(4) of the NLRA, which 
provides that an employer may not “discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee 
because he has filed charges or given testimony under this Act.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4). 
36 See id. at 121. 
37 See id. at 122 (quoting John Hancock Mut. Life. Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 483, 485 (D.C. Cir. 
1951)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
38 See id. 
39 481 U.S. 252 (1987). 
40 See id. at 258.  
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and upheld a statutory scheme that permitted an administrative agency to 
temporarily reinstate a fired whistleblower because “the eventual 
recovery of backpay may not alone provide sufficient protection to 
encourage reports of safety violations.”41 Mirroring the “Hobson’s choice” 
language from Mitchell,42 the Brock Court accepted Congress’ rationale for 
the whistleblower protections: 
 
Section 405 was enacted in 1983 to encourage employee 
reporting of noncompliance with safety regulations 
governing commercial motor vehicles. Congress recognized 
that employees in the transportation industry are often best able to 
detect safety violations and yet, because they may be 
threatened with discharge for cooperating with enforcement 
agencies, they need express protection against retaliation for 
reporting these violations. 
… 
Congress also recognized that the employee's protection 
against having to choose between operating an unsafe 
vehicle and losing his job would lack practical effectiveness 
if the employee could not be reinstated pending complete 
review. The longer a discharged employee remains 
unemployed, the more devastating are the consequences to 
his personal financial condition and prospects for 
reemployment. Ensuring the eventual recovery of backpay 
may not alone provide sufficient protection to encourage 
reports of safety violations. Accordingly, § 405 incorporates 
additional protections, authorizing temporary reinstatement 
based on a preliminary finding of reasonable cause to 
believe that the employee has suffered a retaliatory 
discharge.43  
 
Similarly, the Court paid particularly close attention to the role Title 
VII’s anti-retaliation provision plays in enforcing that law and advancing 
the Act’s goals, even though Title VII’s legislative history contains little 
insight into the purposes of its anti-retaliation provision. The primary 
purpose of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision, according to the Court in 
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,44, is to help enforce the law by “[m]aintaining 
unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms.”45 In Robinson, the 
Court examined whether Title VII protected former employees from 
                                                 
41 Id. at 258-59. 
42 See Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 293. 
43 Brock, 481 U.S. at 258-59 (emphasis added). 
44 519 U.S. 337 (1997). 
45 Id. at 346. 
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retaliation.46 The Court admitted that, “at first blush” Title VII’s plain 
statutory language excluded former employees from protection because it 
applies only to “employees,” which “would seem to refer to those having 
an existing employment relationship with the employer in question.”47 
Yet, after scrutinizing the term in other parts of Title VII, the Court 
determined that its meaning was “ambiguous.”48 To resolve this 
ambiguity, the Court relied on the Anti-Retaliation Principle, holding that 
former employees should be protected from retaliation because the Court 
did not want to undermine the effectiveness of the statute by “allowing 
the threat of postemployment retaliation to deter victims of discrimination 
from complaining to the EEOC.”49  
The Court also applied the Anti-Retaliation Principle by permitting a 
statutory retaliation claim to proceed even though the statute at issue did 
not contain any anti-retaliation language. In Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 
Inc.,50 the Court held that a statutory anti-discrimination provision, 42 
U.S.C. § 1982, contained an implied cause of action for retaliation.51 Section 
1982 provides that “[a]ll citizens of the United States shall have the same 
right . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, 
hold, and convey real and personal property.”52 Despite the clear absence 
of any explicit protection from retaliation in the statutory language, the 
Sullivan Court upheld a retaliation claim by a white landowner who was 
retaliated against for leasing a house to a black man.53 The Court 
concluded that if an individual could be “punished for trying to vindicate 
the rights of minorities protected by § 1982,” then “[s]uch a sanction 
would give impetus to the perpetuation of racial restrictions on 
property.”54 In other words, enforcing § 1982 meant providing additional 
protection from retaliation, even if the statute itself did not contain any 
explicit anti-retaliation protection.  
The outcomes of retaliation cases also demonstrate the Court’s 
recognition of the Anti-Retaliation Principle’s importance as much as the 
opinions’ language, particularly in statutory cases. For example, during 
the last fifty years, the Court interpreted statutes to enable a broad range 
of individuals to bring retaliation claims, including third parties who 
                                                 
46 See id.  
47 Id. at 341. 
48 Id. at 343-44 (“Once it is established that the term ‘employees’ includes former employees in 
some sections, but not in others, the term standing alone is necessarily ambiguous and each section 
must be analyzed to determine whether the context gives the term a further meaning that would 
resolve the issue in dispute.”). 
49 Id. at 346. 
50 396 U.S. 229 (1969). 
51 See id. at 237. 
52 42 U.S.C. § 1982. 
53 See Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 237. 
54 Id. 
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report statutory violations,55 former employees,56 at-will employees,57 
elected union officials against their union,58 and illegal aliens.59 Moreover, 
the Court indicated that these statutes provide a wide range of remedies60 
to victims of a wide range of retaliatory actions by employers.61 
Significantly, the Court also recognized the importance of state retaliation 
remedies by not permitting federal statutory schemes with weak 
retaliation remedies to impliedly preempt potentially stronger state tort 
claims based on an employer’s retaliation.62  
A few counterexamples exist in which the Court did not recognize the 
Anti-Retaliation Principle and its primary goal of protecting society’s 
interest in law enforcement. Instead, the Court utilized its typical 
“employment law” focus and concentrated only on balancing the interests 
of employers and employees. Clark County School District v. Breeden63 
presents an example of this type of case. In Breeden, the plaintiff alleged 
that she had been retaliated against for complaining about alleged sexual 
harassment and for filing a lawsuit based on the complaint.64 In the case’s 
primary holding, the Supreme Court found in favor of the employer 
                                                 
55 Id. (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1982). 
56 See Robinson, 519 U.S. at 346 (interpreting Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision). 
57 See Haddle v. Garrison, 525 U.S. 121, 125 (1998) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2), which 
prevents “intimidation or retaliation against witnesses in federal-court proceedings,” includes 
protection for at-will employees). 
58 See Sheet Metal Workers’ Intern’l v. Lynn, 488 U.S. 347, 355 (1989) (interpreting Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 412). 
59 See Sure-Tan v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 895-96 (1984) (holding that reporting undocumented 
aliens employees to law enforcement authorities was an unfair labor practice under the National 
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1) & (3), when done in retaliation for participating in union 
activities). 
60 See Brock, 481 U.S. at 258-59 (approving an administrative agency’s power to order 
temporary reinstatement as a remedy for retaliation); Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 296 (finding that FLSA 
gave courts power to award back-pay damages in addition to ordering injunctive relief). But see 
Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 902-03 (restricting the backpay and reinstatement remedies for illegal aliens). 
61 See Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. 53, 126 S. Ct. at 2412-15 (holding that Title VII’s anti-
retaliation provision applies outside of the workplace and prohibits any employer action that 
“could well dissuade a reasonable employees from protected conduct”); Haddle, 525 U.S. at 125 
(preventing companies from firing at-will worker in retaliation for testifying in federal trial); Bill 
Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 744 (1983) (permitting courts to enjoin an 
employer from filing a “baseless” lawsuit to retaliate against an employee in violation of the 
National Labor Relations Act). 
62 See Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 248 (1994) (holding that the Railway 
Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., does not preempt state public policy tort and whistleblower 
claims); English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 90 (1990) (holding that Section 210(a) of the 
Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5851(a) does not preempt employee’s intentional infliction 
of emotional distress claim); Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 412-13 (1988) 
(holding that Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, does not 
preempt employee’s tort remedy for wrongful discharge). But see Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. 
McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990) (holding that Section 510 of the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974. 29 U.S.C. § 1140, expressly preempted employees state common law claim of 
wrongful discharge). 
63 532 U.S. 268 (2001). 
64 See id. at 269-70. 
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because it found that the plaintiff did not engage in protected activity.65 
According to the Court, no reasonable person could have believed that the 
alleged sexual harassment about which the plaintiff complained could 
have violated Title VII because it was a single instance of behavior that 
could not violate the law.66 After Breeden, courts consistently adopted a 
standard that an employee must have a “reasonable belief” in the illegality 
of an employer’s action in order to be protected from retaliation.67 
As applied by the Court in Breeden, this standard may not fully 
advance the goals of the Anti-Retaliation Principle. Indeed, the Breeden 
Court never mentioned the importance of retaliation protection for 
enforcing Title VII. Instead, the Court cited almost exclusively to its sexual 
harassment jurisprudence to demonstrate that the activity about which the 
plaintiff complained could not be considered sexual harassment because it 
was a single incident that was not “extreme” enough to be considered 
“extremely serious”.68 This sexual harassment jurisprudence requires 
“severe or pervasive” employer action that alters the terms and conditions 
of employment,69 a standard derived from the Court’s previous balancing 
of employer and employee interests.70 Unlike the other retaliation cases 
mentioned above, the Court in Breeden never discussed whether its 
holding would promote better compliance with the law.71  
                                                 
65 See id. at 270-72. 
66 See id. at 271. The Court also found that the plaintiff could not prove causation—that any 
protected activity caused an adverse employment action. See id. at 272-73. In doing so, the Court 
relied exclusively on various factual showing regarding the timing of the alleged protected activity 
and the adverse action. See id. The Court did not discuss, or even mention, the appropriate legal 
standard for causation in a retaliation case, nor did the Court attempt to explain any policy 
rationale for the decision. 
67 See Lawrence D. Rosenthal, To Report or Not to Report: The Case for Eliminating the Objectively 
Reasonable Requirement for Opposition Activities under Title VII’s Anti-retaliation Provision, 39 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 1127, 1129 n.7 (2007) (stating that all United States Circuit Courts adopted the objectively 
reasonable standard after Breeden) (citing cases). Courts also use the reasonable belief standards for 
other statutes, such as Title IX and Title VI, that do not specify the standard to be utilized. See 
Brake, supra note 7, at 83 (citing cases). 
68 See id. at 270-71 (citing to Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), Burlington Industries, 
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998), 
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993), and Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 
U.S. 57 (1986)). 
69 See, e.g., Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 67. 
70 See, e.g., Faragher, 524 U.S. at 793-808 (balancing various employer and employee interests in 
creating vicarious liability rule for supervisors under Title VII but also providing for employer 
affirmative defense); Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80-82 (asserting the reasons why permitting same-sex 
sexual harassment claims would not turn Title VII into a “general civility code” and stating that 
“[c]ommon sense, and an appropriate sensitivity to social context, will enable courts and juries to 
distinguish between simple teasing or roughhousing among members of the same sex, and conduct 
which a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would find severely hostile or abusive”); 
Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (noting that the Court’s sexual harassment standard “takes a middle path”). 
71 The case likely does not represent a serious deviation from the Anti-Retaliation Principle. 
One group of commentators states that Breeden “may simply be a case of unsympathetic plaintiffs 
making ‘bad law,’” rather than a “signal of the Supreme Court’s hostility to retaliation cases in 
general.” See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 160 (3rd ed. 2005). 
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To be fair, though, the “reasonable belief” standard adopted by the 
Court seems more generous to employees than requiring the employee to 
report an actual illegality, another viable option at the time because the 
statute’s language supports providing protection only if an employee 
opposes employment practices that are “made . . . unlawful” by Title VII.72 
In other words, the Court could have justified a standard requiring the 
reporting employee to prove actual employer illegality instead of only a 
reasonable belief that conduct was illegal.73 Moreover, several “employee-
friendly” retaliation statutes explicitly adopt the “reasonable belief” 
standard articulated in Breeden and many would consider that to be a 
sensible requirement for protection from retaliation, assuming it is applied 
appropriately.74 In Breeden, however, the Court adopted this standard 
without examining its effect on the goal of anti-retaliation protection: to 
increase compliance with the law. Moreover, the application of the 
standard in Breeden may have encouraged subsequent courts to 
inappropriately scrutinize an employee’s whistleblowing complaint by 
placing itself in the position of the employee and assuming too much legal 
knowledge.75 In Part III, infra, this Article addresses how the Anti-
Retaliation Principle could better inform the application of Breeden’s 
reasonable person standard. 
The Court also has read other anti-retaliation statutory provisions 
more narrowly than the Anti-Retaliation Principle might have required. In 
Graham County Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S. ex rel. Wilson,76 for 
example, the Court held that the statute of limitations for the retaliation 
provision of the False Claims Act (FCA)77 should be based upon the most 
closely analogous state limitations period rather than the likely longer six-
year statute of limitations that applies to the other provisions of the Act.78 
The Court recognized that the limitations provision was “ambiguous,” but 
ignored the Anti-Retaliation Principle.79 Instead, the Court based its 
holding on the application of several different principles of statutory 
construction rather than a consideration of whether various statutes of 
limitations would encourage or discourage employees to report illegal 
                                                 
72 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). See also Rosenthal, supra note 67, at 1133 (“[T]he statutory language 
indicates that the activity the employee opposes must violate Title VII.”). 
73 See EEOC v. C & D Sportswear Corp., 398 F. Supp. 300, 306 (M.D. Ga. 1975); Rosenthal, supra 
note 67, at 1140-41 (“[T]he Court’s language [in Breeden] suggested that perhaps it would require an 
actual violation, as the statute’s language requires.”) 
74 See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1); Consumer Product Safety 
Improvement Act 2008, 15 U.S.C. § 2087(a)(1); see also discussion infra Part III.B. 
75 See discussion infra Part III.B (providing examples of lower courts inappropriately applying 
Breeden’s reasonable belief standard). 
76 545 U.S. 409 (2005). 
77 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h). 
78 See Graham Cty., 545 U.S. at 422. 
79 See id. at 415-17. 
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conduct.80 As the dissent in that case noted, the Court’s holding would 
likely undermine the Anti-Retaliation Principle by leaving some 
whistleblowers at the mercy of state statute of limitations that likely are 
shorter than the FCA’s six year limitations period.81 Privileging the Anti-
Retaliation Principle over other canons of statutory construction, as the 
Court did in the five recent statutory retaliation cases,82 would have likely 
led to stronger retaliation protection—the outcome advocated by the 
dissent.83 
More recently, the Court undermined qui tam whistleblower rights 
under the False Claims Act by finding that whistleblowers could not rely 
on disclosures made in state and local administrative reports.84 Although 
this case did not address the FCA’s retaliation provision, it likely will 
reduce the number of whistleblowers potentially protected from 
retaliation simply because it narrows the scope of an employee’s 
“protected activity” that triggers anti-retaliation protection.85 That said, 
the Court’s opinion focused more on the balancing necessary in a qui tam 
case rather than on the balancing retaliation cases require.86 Moreover, 
even in this case, to some extent the Court actually reinforced the core law 
enforcement tenet of the Anti-Retaliation Principle. The Court defended 
its holding by noting that it would not give state and local governments a 
way to immunize themselves from a qui tam lawsuit, thereby increasing 
illegal fraud.87 If state and local governments disclosed fraud in an 
administrative report, then the United States and the “most deserving” 
whistleblowers could still bring a qui tam action to ensure the law is 
enforced.88  
                                                 
80 See id. at 418-19. 
81 See id. at 427-28 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
82 See discussion infra Part II.C. 
83 See Graham Cty., 545 U.S. at 427-28 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The Court also narrowly read the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to exclude a whistleblower’s retaliation claim; however, the 
Court never examined or mentioned the Anti-Retaliation Principle. See Saudia Arabia v. Nelson, 
507 U.S. 349, 362-63 (1993). Instead of focusing on whistleblower issues, the Court’s analysis 
focused on whether the alleged retaliatory action was “commercial” or conducted pursuant to the 
police power of a foreign sovereign nation. See id. at 360-63.  
84 See Graham County Soil and Water Conservation District v. United States ex rel. Wilson, ___ 
U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (2010). 
85 See, e.g., McAllan v. Von Essen, 517 F. Supp.2d 672, 685-86 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding that 
plaintiff did not engage in protected conduct by filing a qui tam action because his complaint was 
based on publicly-available information, and therefore was not “in furtherance” of an FCA case, as 
required by the FCA’s retaliation provision, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)). 
86 The Court described the goal of the qui tam provision as “[s]eeking the golden mean between 
adequate incentives for whistle-blowing insiders with genuinely valuable information and 
discouragement of opportunistic plaintiffs who have no significant information to contribute of 
their own.” Graham County, 130 S. Ct. at 1406 (quoting United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal R. 
Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
87 See id. at 1410-11. 
88 Id. at 1410. The Court called identified whistleblowers who were the original source of the 
information about fraud as the “most deserving” whistleblowers who would not be hurt by the 
rule. See id. 
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Taken together, these few “limiting” cases may nibble around the 
edges of the Anti-Retaliation Principle. However, they do not undermine 
the Principle’s power when explaining the balance of Supreme Court 
retaliation jurisprudence and its broad recognition of the importance of 
anti-retaliation protection. During the last fifty years, the Court’s 
retaliation jurisprudence involving statutory cases sends a clear message: 
employees comprise an important part of enforcing statutory laws and the 
Court will provide employees broad protection from retaliation in order 
to enhance enforcement of those laws. 
B. First Amendment Protection 
The Court’s First Amendment retaliation jurisprudence provides a 
slightly more nuanced application of the Anti-Retaliation Principle. 
Although the Anti-Retaliation Principle informs the Court’s jurisprudence 
regarding First Amendment protections for government employees who 
disclose illegal conduct, it does not drive the decisions in the same way as 
with statutory claims.  
Beginning with Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Township High School Dist. 
205,89 the Court has held that the First Amendment can prohibit the 
government from retaliating against employees who speak out as citizens 
regarding matters of public concern.90 As recently put by the Court, “[s]o 
long as employees are speaking as citizens about matters of public 
concern, they must face only those speech restrictions that are necessary 
for their employers to operate efficiently and effectively.”91 This “public 
concern” test provides potentially broader protection than the Anti-
Retaliation Principle’s “law enforcement” focus because protected 
employee speech may involve a matter of public concern but not any 
violation of the law.92 As a result, the Court’s incorporation of the 
Principle in its First Amendment case law requires a more nuanced 
examination of the cases. 
First, in accordance with the Anti-Retaliation Principle, the Court 
repeatedly has emphasized that the First Amendment must protect 
government employees because these employees often have knowledge 
the public would want to know about government operations. For 
example, in the seminal Pickering case, the Court prohibited the discharge 
of a teacher for speaking about school funding.93 The Court protected the 
                                                 
89 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
90 See id. at 568. 
91 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006) (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 
(1983)). 
92 See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574 (noting that the First Amendment protected a teacher who 
spoke about school budget issues because the topic was a matter of public concern). 
93 See id. (“[A] teacher’s exercise of his right to speak on issues of public importance may not 
furnish the basis for his dismissal from public employment.”). 
THE SUPREME COURT’S ANTI-RETALIATION PRINCIPLE 
61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. (forthcoming Jan. 2011) 
 
 17 
teacher from retaliation, in part, because “[t]eachers are, as a class, the 
members of a community most likely to have informed and definite 
opinions as to how funds allotted to the operations of the schools should 
be spent. Accordingly, it is essential that they be able to speak out freely 
on such questions without fear of retaliatory dismissal.”94 Similarly, in 
Waters v. Churchill,95 the Court recognized that government employees 
“are often in the best position to know what ails the agencies for which 
they work.”96 The Court’s use of the Anti-Retaliation Principle in First 
Amendment cases recognizes employees’ special knowledge and protects 
them from retaliation in order to encourage making this information 
public.  
Second, the Court’s First Amendment test considers not just the 
balance between the employee’s and employer’s rights, but also asserts 
that courts must balance society’s right to information as well. For 
example, in Pickering, the Court upheld a First Amendment retaliation 
claim in order to protect the “public interest in having free and 
unhindered debate on matters of public importance.”97 Later cases noted 
the Court’s concern for retaliation protection in this area because the fear 
of discharge could “chill” employee participation in public affairs, which 
would damage larger societal interests.98 As put most explicitly by the 
Court in San Diego v. Roe,99 
 
[u]nderlying the decision in Pickering is the recognition that 
public employees are often the members of the community 
who are likely to have informed opinions as to the 
operations of their public employers, operations which are 
of substantial concern to the public. Were they not able to 
                                                 
94 Id. at 572; see also Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421 (noting that “many other categories of public 
employees” in addition to teachers also will have “informed and definite” opinions about issues 
related to their job). 
95 511 U.S. 661 (1994). 
96 See id. at 674; see also San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (per curiam) (noting that public 
employees have “informed opinions on important public issues”). 
97 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574. 
98 See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996) (noting that an 
independent contractor relationship with the government “provides a valuable financial benefit, 
the threat of the loss of which in retaliation for speech may chill speech on matters of public 
concern by those who, because of their dealings with the government, “are often in the best 
position to know what ails the agencies for which they work’” (quoting Waters v. Churchill, 511 
U.S. 661, 674, 114 S.Ct. 1878, 1887, 128 L.Ed.2d 686 (1994)); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 144-45 
(1983) (“In all of these cases, the precedents in which Pickering is rooted, the invalidated statutes 
and actions sought to suppress the rights of public employees to participate in public affairs. The 
issue was whether government employees could be prevented or ‘chilled’ by the fear of discharge 
from joining political parties and other associations that certain public officials might find 
‘subversive.’”); cf. Sheet Metal Workers’ Intern’l v. Lynn, 488 U.S. 347, 355 (1989) (noting the 
“chilling effect” of speech retaliation, which the “free speech” provision of the Labor Management 
Reporting and Disclosure Act aimed to prevent). 
99 543 U.S. 77 (2004) (per curium) (citation omitted). 
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speak on these matters, the community would be deprived 
of informed opinions on important public issues. The 
interest at stake is as much the public's interest in receiving 
informed opinion as it is the employee's own right to 
disseminate it.100  
 
The “public concern” doctrinal requirement acknowledges that more is at 
stake than simply the employer-employee relationship. The government is 
an employer, but it cannot restrict speech in which society might be 
interested. Consistent with the Anti-Retaliation Principle, this 
constitutional test differs from the Court’s typical focus in non-retaliation 
employment cases by considering society’s interest in protecting 
employees with important information. 
Third, the Court has recognized that much of this First Amendment-
protected speech will necessarily relate to employee reports regarding 
violations of the law.101 In Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School 
District,102 an employee informed her principal that the school district’s 
policies were discriminatory, which the Court later recognized as 
“clear[ly]” involving a matter of public concern.103 The Court provided 
even more insight in Connick v. Myers,104 a case in which the Court found 
that an employee’s behavior was, for the most part, not protected because 
the employee was not speaking about a matter of public concern.105 The 
Court contrasted the non-protected speech in Connick with examples of 
speech that would be protected, such as “bring[ing] to light actual or 
potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust” on the part of other 
government employees.106 Thus, although the “public concern” test is not 
solely about law enforcement, the Court certainly has supported the Anti-
Retaliation Principle by providing First Amendment protection to 
government employees who bring illegalities to light.107 
                                                 
100 Id. at 82. 
101 By protecting speech related to a “public concern,” the Court certainly has a purpose 
broader than solely enhancing law enforcement—the Court encourages debate related to a wide-
range of topics. However, as described in the following text, protected topics of “public concern” 
often relate to employee reports of illegal conduct. 
102 439 U.S. 410 (1979). 
103 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 146 (citing to Givhan and stating that “[a]lthough the subject-matter 
of Mrs. Givhan’s statements were not the issue before the Court, it is clear that her statements 
concerning the school district’s allegedly racially discriminatory policies involved a matter of 
public concern”); see id. at 148 n.8 (noting that the Givhan plaintiff’s protest regarding racial 
discrimination was “a matter inherently of public concern”). 
104 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
105 See id. at 147-49. 
106 Id. at 148. 
107 This conclusion must be tempered somewhat by the Court’s decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 
547 U.S. 410 (2006), in which the Court held that the First Amendment did not protect an employee 
who reported misconduct if that report was made as part of the employee’s job duties. See id. at 421 
(“We hold that when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the 
employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does 
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In constitutional cases in particular, the Principle does not mean that 
employees always win. In several constitutional cases after Pickering, the 
Court determined that the First Amendment did not protect the employee 
who brought a claim. None of these cases, however, involved an 
employee who claimed protection because the employee identified 
violations of the law. Instead, losing employees claimed protection based 
on speech unrelated to illegal conduct, including complaints about a 
school dress code,108 criticisms of an agency,109 threats to patient care,110 
and personnel matters.111 Indeed, before Garcetti, whether the Court 
granted First Amendment protection to employee speech is precisely 
correlated with whether the speech related to reports of illegality. An 
employee reported a violation of law in each of the only two cases since 
Pickering in which the Court upheld a First Amendment claim. In Givhan, 
the employee made an internal report about potential violations of 
discrimination laws.112 In Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Umbehr,113 the Court 
extended First Amendment protection to an independent contractor (as 
opposed to an employee) who made critical statements about a county 
government, including an accusation that the county had violated the 
law.114  
As with statutory violations, some Supreme Court First Amendment 
decisions actually seem to undermine retaliation protection. For example, 
the Court’s decision in Mt. Healthy City Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle115 
provides employers an affirmative defense in First Amendment retaliation 
cases if the employer can demonstrate that it would have made the same 
employment decision even in the absence of the employee’s protected 
conduct116—a defense that Congress subsequently adopted in several 
                                                                                                                                     
not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”). I discuss this case and explain this 
discrepancy in more detail infra Parts II.B. & II.C. 
108 See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 282 (1977). 
109 See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 369 (1983). 
110 See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 665-66 (1994). In Waters, the parties disputed the 
precise speech involved, but the Court found that, even if the employee’s version was true, she 
conducted the speech in a disruptive manner, making it unprotected. See id. at 680-81. 
111 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-148 (1983). One part of Connick presents a close 
question regarding whether the Court upheld retaliation against an employee reporting illegality. 
In Connick, the Court found that one question on a questionnaire an employee distributed to fellow 
employees did involve a matter of public concern: whether employees ever felt pressure to work 
on political campaigns on behalf of candidates supported by the government employer. See id. at 
149. The Court found that this question involved “coercion of belief in violation of fundamental 
constitutional rights.” Id. The Court held, however, that the Pickering balancing of interests did not 
support permitting a constitutional retaliation claim because the questionnaire disrupted the office 
and involved a matter of public concern “in only a most limited sense.” See id. at 151-54. 
112 See Givhan, 439 U.S. at 413. 
113 518 U.S. 668 (1996). 
114 See id. at 671. 
115 429 U.S. 274 (1977). 
116 See id. at 287. 
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whistleblower statutes117 and that courts often incorporate when 
construing other anti-retaliation protections.118 Although this decision 
provides less protection to employees, it does not necessarily do so at the 
expense of the Principle. In fact, the Court implicitly considered the 
Principle when it reached this result, finding that the “constitutional 
principle at stake is sufficiently vindicated” when employers are still able 
to make an employment decision based upon an employee’s non-
protected conduct.119 According to the Court, for all of the good that 
government employees can do when they bring misconduct to public 
light, they should not be able to put themselves in a “better position” as a 
result of their disclosure than they would have been had they remained 
quiet.120 Consistent with the Anti-Retaliation Principle, government 
employees who engage in constitutionally protected speech will be 
protected in the first instance. Mt. Healthy affirms that Principle, even if it 
makes clear that protected speech will not inoculate an employee from 
disciplinary action based on other conduct.121  
Yet, despite incorporating and identifying aspects of the Anti-
Retaliation Principle in its constitutional retaliation cases, the Court has 
indicated at least one substantive limit even when employees report 
potential violations of the law. Statutes, not the Constitution, should drive 
the Principle. In Bush v. Lucas,122 the Court prohibited a federal employee 
from bringing a First Amendment retaliation case for damages against a 
retaliatory supervisor.123 In that case, the Court recognized the Anti-
Retaliation Principle, but thought that existing statutory protections under 
the Civil Service Reform Act sufficiently protected the Principle: “In the 
past [Congress] has demonstrated its awareness that lower-level 
government employees are a valuable source of information, and that 
supervisors might improperly attempt to curtail their subordinates' 
                                                 
117 See, e.g., Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century, 49 U.S.C. 
§ 42121(b)(2)(B)(ii); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(C) (adopting procedures of 
49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)). However, in these statutes Congress required employers to prove this 
affirmative defense by “clear and convincing” evidence. See id.  
118 See DANIEL P. WESTMAN & NANCY M. MODESITT, WHISTLEBLOWING: THE LAW OF RETALIATORY 
DISCHARGE 234-35 & 235 n.42 (2d ed. 2004) (citing cases). 
119 See Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 286. 
120 See id. at 285. 
121 Of course, fact-finders may have an extremely difficult time applying these standard in 
reality, as it requires a relatively difficult inquiry into employer motives. The point here is that the 
Court upheld the core tenet of the Principle even as it was finding against a whistleblowing 
employee in this particular case. 
122 462 U.S. 367 (1983). 
123 See id. at 385-90. Although the employee in Bush did not report a violation of the law, the 
Court’s holding was broad enough to prohibit constitutional damages even to federal employees 
who reported illegalities. See id. at 369-72 (noting that the employee alleged retaliation based on the 
employee’s criticism of a government agency and assuming that the government supervisor had 
violated the employee’s First Amendment rights by demoting him because of this protected 
speech). 
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freedom of expression.”124 Given the presence of the Civil Service Reform 
Act protections, the Court determined that it should not second-guess 
Congress’ conclusion regarding the extent to which the Principle should 
be protected.125  
Thus, for the most part, prior to 2006 the Court’s First Amendment 
retaliation cases recognized and advanced the Anti-Retaliation Principle. 
Because society has an important interest in learning about the valuable 
information known by government employees, the Constitution protects 
government employees who reported violations of the law. However, the 
Court did impose a limitation on the Principle based on the Court’s 
understanding that statutes, not the Constitution, should drive anti-
retaliation protection if statutes addressed the issue. 
II.  The Present: Six Retaliation Cases in Five Years 
The Supreme Court’s six recent retaliation cases build upon this 
extensive jurisprudence and reflect the Court’s historical recognition of 
the Anti-Retaliation Principle. Five decisions related to the extent to which 
various federal statutes prohibited retaliation in employment, including 
three that involved implied protection from retaliation in three different 
statutes without an express anti-retaliation provision.126 The other two, 
one in 2006127 and one most recently in 2009,128 analyzed the express anti-
retaliation provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.129 As 
explained below, the Court provided broad retaliation protection in all 
five statutory cases, often with explicit reference to the Principle, despite 
traditional statutory interpretation and policy rationales that might argue 
for more narrow holdings. In Garcetti v. Ceballos,130 the lone constitutional 
case among the six recent decisions, the Court explicitly recognized the 
Principle, but also continued its more limited view of retaliation 
protections in constitutional cases based on the Court’s preference for 
statutory coverage.131  
The first two sub-parts that follow briefly describe these six recent 
cases and summarize the Court’s decisions. The third sub-part analyzes 
the cases in light of the Court’s historic use of the Anti-Retaliation 
Principle. 
                                                 
124 Id. at 389. 
125 See id. 
126 See CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1954 (2008); Gomez-Perez 
v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 128 S. Ct. 1931, 1935 (2008); Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 
167, 171 (2005) 
127 See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006). 
128 See Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846 (2009). 
129 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
130 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
131 See discussion infra Part II.B & II.C. 
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A. Statutory Protection 
Statutory anti-retaliation protection can be either express or implied. 
Express provisions provide the most common form of protection: over 
thirty-five federal statutes contain an explicit provision protecting 
employees from retaliation for undertaking various protected activities.132 
These statutes often detail the type of employees and employers covered 
by the provision, the type of activity in which employees must engage to 
be protected, and the type of remedy available to employees.133 More 
rarely, a court will find that a statute that does not provide explicit 
protection still contains anti-retaliation protections implicitly.134 Because 
of a general judicial reluctance to imply statutory remedies, the Court only 
upheld one implied retaliation claim prior to 2005—Sullivan v. Little 
Hunting Park, Inc.,135 discussed above136—and that case did not involve an 
employee.137 Beginning in 2005, however, the Court upheld implied 
retaliation claims by employees in three separate cases involving three 
separate statutes.  
1. Implied Retaliation Protection 
The first of these three cases, Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ.,138 
involved the claim by a high school teacher and basketball coach that the 
Birmingham Board of Education retaliated against him because he 
complained about sex discrimination in his school’s athletic program.139 
The plaintiff asserted his claim of retaliation under Title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972,140 which generally prohibits 
discrimination “on the basis of sex” in federally funded education 
programs.141  
                                                 
132 See WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 118, at 319-20 (listing statutes). 
133 See Richard E. Moberly, Contract Protection for Whistleblowers, 79 COLO. L. REV. 975, 981-83 
(2008). 
134 See KOHN, supra note 26, at 87-88. 
135 396 U.S. 229 (1969). 
136 See discussion supra Part I.A. 
137 Recall that in Sullivan, the Court held that a white property owner stated a claim under 42 
U.S.C. § 1982 when he alleged that a home owner’s association retaliated against him for leasing his 
house to a black man. See Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 237. 
138 544 U.S. 167 (2005).  
139 See id. at 171. The plaintiff had complained that the girls’ basketball team received unequal 
funding and had unequal access to athletic equipment and facilities. See id. After his complaints, 
the plaintiff received negative evaluations and the school removed him as the girls’ basketball 
coach, both of which the plaintiff claimed were retaliation for his earlier complaints. See id. at 172.  
140 Pub. L. 92-318, 86 Stat. 373, as amended, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. 
141 The provision’s language states that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of 
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 
1681(a). 
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The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Title IX does not 
provide a private right of action for retaliation because the statutory 
language does not include a specific provision prohibiting retaliation.142 
By contrast, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, passed only eight 
years before Title IX, contains a very specific anti-retaliation provision that 
serves as the model for many modern retaliation protections.143 According 
to the Birmingham Board of Education, Title VII demonstrated that 
Congress knew how to write a specific anti-retaliation provision.144 The 
absence of such a specific provision in Title IX meant that Congress must 
have purposefully excluded retaliation protection from Title IX.145  
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court disagreed, reversed the Eleventh 
Circuit, and found an implied claim for retaliation in Title IX.146 The Court 
used three arguments to overcome the problem presented by Title IX’s 
silence regarding retaliation. First, the Court asserted that 
“discrimination” should be construed broadly to cover “a wide range of 
intentional unequal treatment.”147 In other words, the Court found that 
retaliation is discrimination “’on the basis of sex’ because it is an 
intentional response to the nature of the complaint: an allegation of sex 
discrimination.”148  
Second, in an interesting twist on the defendant’s argument regarding 
statutory silence, the Court noted that Title VII “is a vastly different 
statute from Title IX,” because Title IX contains a general prohibition on 
discrimination, while Title VII provides very specific examples of conduct 
that constitutes unlawful discrimination.149 Thus, “[b]ecause Congress did 
not list any specific discriminatory practices when it wrote Title IX, its 
failure to mention one such practice does not tell [the Court] anything 
about whether it intended that practice to be covered.”150  
                                                 
142 See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 309 F.3d 1333, 1344, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002). The Court 
of Appeals also found that a Department of Education regulation prohibiting retaliation could not 
create, on its own, a private right of action. See id. at 1346. 
143 Title VII prohibits retaliation against an employee who has “opposed any practice made an 
unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or 
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII].” Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 704, 78 Stat. 257, as amended, 86 Stat. 109, as codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-3(a). Other anti-discrimination statutes provide anti-retaliation protection with similar 
provisions based upon the language in Title VII. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 
29 U.S.C. § 623(d); Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12203. 
144 See Jackson, 544 U.S. at 175 (noting defendant’s argument). 
145 See id.; see also id. at 190 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (comparing Title IX to Title VII’s explicit 
anti-retaliation provision and asserting that the absence of a specific retaliation provision is 
“significant”).  
146 See Jackson, 544 U.S. at 171. Justice O’Connor authored the majority opinion. Justice Thomas 
filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia and Kennedy. See 
id. at 184 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
147 Jackson, 544 U.S. at 175. 
148 Id. at 174. 
149 Id. at 175. 
150 Id. at 175. 
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Third, the Court relied upon Sullivan,151 an almost forty year-old case, 
as precedent for interpreting a general prohibition on discrimination to 
include a claim for retaliation.152 Although Justice Thomas, in a dissent 
joined by three other Justices, claimed that Sullivan was a standing case 
that merely permitted the white property owner to assert the claim of the 
black tenant,153 the majority found that “Sullivan’s holding was not so 
limited.”154 Rather, for the Jackson majority, Sullivan “plainly held that the 
white owner could maintain his own private cause of action under § 1982 
if he could show that he was ‘punished for trying to vindicate the rights of 
minorities.’”155 Because the Court viewed Sullivan’s holding as implying a 
claim of retaliation in a general discrimination statute, the Court found 
that Congress likely intended the same interpretation for Title IX, which 
was passed only three years after the Court decided Sullivan.156 Moreover, 
not only did the Court hold that Title IX includes an implied claim of 
retaliation, but also it relied upon Sullivan to find that the retaliation claim 
protected both the original victims of discrimination as well as a third-
party (like Coach Jackson) who complains about the original 
discrimination.157 As Justice Thomas in dissent put it, the majority created 
“an entirely new cause of action for a secondary rights holder, beyond the 
claim of the original rights holder.”158 
In two cases decided in 2008, the Court returned to the issue presented 
by Jackson: whether a general anti-discrimination provision also provides 
an implied claim of retaliation. The first case, CBOCS West, Inc. v. 
Humphries159 examined 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to determine if it “encompasses a 
complaint of retaliation against a person who has complained about a 
violation of another person’s contract-related ‘right.’”160 Like Section 1982 
in Sullivan and Title IX in Jackson, Section 1981 does not include an explicit 
anti-retaliation provision; rather, the statute generally prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of race in “mak[ing] and enforc[ing] 
contracts.”161 Nevertheless, as in Sullivan and Jackson, the Supreme Court 
                                                 
151 396 U.S. 229 (1969). 
152 See Jackson, 544 U.S. at 176 (citing Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969)). 
153 See id. at 194-95 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that Sullivan cited to a standing case and 
stated that there was “no question but that Sullivan has standing to maintain this action” (citing 
Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 237)). 
154 Jackson, 544 U.S. at 176 n.1. 
155 Id. (quoting Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 237).  
156 See id. at 176. 
157 See id. at 179-80 (noting that Sullivan “made clear that retaliation claims extend to those who 
oppose discrimination against others”). 
158 See Jackson, 544 U.S. at 194 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
159 553 U.S. 442, 128 S. Ct. 1951 (2008). 
160 Id. at 1954. The employee in CBOCS West reported alleged discrimination against a co-
worker. See id. 
161 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). 
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in CBOCS West found an implied claim of retaliation contained in this 
general language.162 
This time, unlike in Jackson, the Court did not debate the meaning of 
Sullivan or whether a general anti-discrimination statute could include 
specific protection from retaliation.163 Rather, the Court found that Jackson 
definitively resolved those issues and, therefore, the CBOCS West holding 
rested “in significant part upon the principles of stare decisis.”164 The fact 
that the Court previously interpreted Section 1981 similarly to Section 
1982 (at issue in Sullivan) only added to the stare decisis rationale.165  
In some respects, CBOCS West represents even stronger support for 
implied retaliation claims than Jackson. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Alito joined the Court between the Jackson and CBOCS West decisions, 
which many commentators predicted would make the Court more 
employer-oriented than the Jackson Court.166 Yet, despite these changes to 
the Court’s composition, the Court decided CBOCS West with a seven-
justice majority that included Roberts and Alito,167 more than signed on to 
the 5-4 Jackson decision.168  
Moreover, in at least one way, the CBOCS West employee-plaintiff had 
to overcome a stronger argument based on the statutory language of 
                                                 
162 See CBOCS West, 128 S. Ct. at 1954. 
163 The Court accepted Jackson’s interpretation that Sullivan permitted a retaliation claim under 
Section 1982. See id. at 1955. To overcome the defendant’s argument that the text of Section 1981 did 
not explicitly include protection from retaliation, the Court also relied on Jackson’s interpretation 
that Title IX encompassed retaliation claims even though it does not use the word “retaliation.” See 
id. at 1958-59. 
164 Id. at 1955. 
165 See id. at 1955-56 (“While the Sullivan decision interpreted § 1982, our precedents have long 
construed §§ 1981 and 1982 similarly.”). 
166 See, e.g., Editorial: Judge Alito’s Radical Views, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 23, 2006), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/23/opinion/23mon1.html (“Judge Alito has consistently 
shown a bias in favor of those in power over those who need the law to protect them. Women, 
racial minorities, the elderly and workers who come to court seeking justice should expect little 
sympathy.”); National Women’s Law Center, Judge Alito Has Taken Positions That Would Undermine 
Critical Anti-Discrimination Protections For Women, available at 
www.nwlc.org/pdf/010306_JudgeAlitoSexDiscrimination.pdf (“[Alito] would act to weaken the 
federal laws against discrimination in the workplace.”); John Kroger, Bench Brawl, SALON.COM (Oct. 
31, 2005), available at http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/feature/2005/10/31/alito_reax 
(noting Alito’s conservative record in employment cases); More Groups Announce Opposition to 
Roberts (Sept. 21, 2005), available at http://www.nominationwatch.org/judge_john_roberts/ 
(noting labor and union group opposition to Roberts); Michael Scherer, Why Big Business Hearts 
John Roberts, SALON.COM (Aug. 11, 2005), available at 
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2005/08/11/roberts_business; Alliance for Justice, Report 
on the Nomination of John G. Roberts to the United States Supreme Court, at 3, available at 
www.afj.org/afj_roberts_prehearing_report.pdf (“Judge Roberts’ apparent view of Congress’ 
authority potentially threatens a wide swath of legislation rooted in the Commerce Clause, 
including civil rights safeguards, minimum wage and maximum hours laws, clean air, clean water, 
and workplace safety protections.”). 
167 Justice Breyer wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Alito. See CBOCS West, 128 S. Ct. at 1954. Justice Thomas 
wrote a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justice Scalia. See id. 
168 See Jackson, 544 U.S. at 170.  
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Section 1981 than the Jackson plaintiff had to address under Title IX. 
Recent Congressional amendments to Section 1981 gave support to those 
who argued that the statute did not protect employees from retaliation 
because the amendments failed to address retaliation specifically. In 1989, 
the Court held in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union169 that the anti-
discriminatory language of Section 1981 (“to make and enforce contracts”) 
did not apply to “conduct by the employer after the contract relation has 
been established, including breach of the terms of the contract or 
imposition of discriminatory working conditions.”170 Although Patterson 
did not specifically involve a retaliation claim, Courts of Appeals 
interpreted Patterson to preclude retaliation claims under Section 1981, 
because most retaliation victims will have opposed discriminatory 
conduct after the formation of the contract, thus taking whistleblowing 
employees out of Section 1981’s protective scope.171 Two years after 
Patterson, Congress passed Section 101 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991172 to 
explicitly overrule the case by adding a new subsection (b) to Section 1981: 
“For purposes of this section, the term ‘make and enforce contracts' 
includes the making, performance, modification, and termination of 
contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and 
conditions of the contractual relationship.”173 Notably, the amended 
provision did not explicitly provide anti-retaliation protection.  
The absence of anti-retaliation language in the 1991 amendments 
presented more difficulty for the CBOCS West plaintiff than the statutory 
silence in Title IX at issue in Jackson, for two reasons. First, immediately 
before and after the 1991 Civil Rights Act, Congress enacted several very 
specific anti-retaliation provisions in other employment statutes, such as 
the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act,174 the 1993 Family and Medical 
Leave Act,175 and the 1994 Uniformed Services Employment and 
Reemployment Act.176 Also, in 1994 Congress amended the Surface 
Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 to include explicit anti-retaliation 
protection.177 In other words, Congress clearly knew how to enact an 
explicit anti-retaliation provision and how to amend an older statute to 
include one. However, Congress chose not to include a specific anti-
retaliation provision in its amendment of Section 1981, which could 
                                                 
169 491 U.S. 164 (1989). 
170 Id. at 177 (emphasis added). 
171 See CBOCS West, 128 S. Ct. at 1956-57 (listing Courts of Appeals cases barring retaliation 
claims under Section 1981) 
172 105 Stat. 1071. 
173 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b). 
174 See 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) & (b). 
175 See 29 U.S.C. § 2615. 
176 See 38 U.S.C. § 4311(b). 
177 See 49 U.S.C. § 31105. 
THE SUPREME COURT’S ANTI-RETALIATION PRINCIPLE 
61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. (forthcoming Jan. 2011) 
 
 27 
indicate a specific intent to exclude retaliation claims from Section 1981’s 
coverage. 
Second, by 1991, the Supreme Court had begun requiring courts to 
construe statutory language strictly when determining whether an 
implied right of action existed—a change from the judicial atmosphere in 
1972 when Congress passed Title IX. Most immediately, two years before 
Congress passed the 1991 Civil Rights Act that amended Section 1981, 
Patterson required such a narrow textual reading of Section 1981 
specifically.178 More broadly, since 1975 in Cort v. Ash,179 the Court made 
clear that it would focus its statutory interpretation efforts on legislative 
intent, rather than the more permissive pre-Cort emphasis on legislative 
purpose.180 Thus, even if Congress could have had Sullivan’s purportedly 
broad reading of Section 1982 on its mind when it passed Title IX in 1972, 
as Jackson concluded,181 Congress would have been under no illusion in 
1991 that it needed to include in its statutes explicit language regarding 
protection from retaliation.182 Thus, the primary statutory interpretation 
argument utilized by the Court in Jackson held much less power when the 
CBOCS West evaluated the changes the 1991 Civil Rights Act made to 
Section 1981. 
The Court dismissed these arguments, however, by pointing to the 
1991 Act’s legislative history. A House Report indicated that the amended 
provision would provide protection from a long list of employment 
actions, including retaliation.183 Moreover, a footnote in the same Report 
noted that the legislation would restore the right to sue for retaliation that 
courts assumed Patterson had eliminated.184 Therefore, because the 
purpose of the 1991 Act was to nullify Patterson, the Court concluded that 
Congress also must have intended to “embrace pre-Patterson law,” 
including Sullivan.185 
                                                 
178 See Patterson, 491 U.S. at 180-81 (noting that Section 1981 is “limited to the enumerated 
rights within its express protection”). 
179 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
180 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 1131 (4th ed. 2007) 
(noting that Cort v. Ash “marks a watershed in the legisprudence of implied causes of action. Before 
Cort, private causes of action were usually implied; after Cort, usually not”); see also Humphries v. 
CBOCS West, Inc., 474 F.3d 387, 410 (7th Cir. 2007) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting in part) (“[S]ince the 
1970s the Court has lashed interpretation more closely to statutory text.”). 
181 See Jackson, 544 U.S. at 176. 
182 As Judge Easterbrook noted in dissent in the 7th Circuit case that led to the Supreme Court’s 
CBOCS West decision: “There has been a sea change in interpretative method between Sullivan and 
today-and Patterson not only exemplifies the change but also applies it to § 1981. . . . [W]hen § 1981 
was amended in 1991, decisions such as Cort and Rodriguez and Patterson had announced a textual 
approach.” See Humphries, 474 F.3d at 411 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting in part). 
183 See CBOCS West, 128 S. Ct. at 1957 (citing H.R.Rep. No. 102-40, pt. 1, p. 92 (1991)). 
184 See id. (citing H.R.Rep. No. 102-40, pt. 1, pp. 92-93, n. 92 (1991)). 
185 Id. at 1959. Adding to the anomalous nature of this conclusion, the Court recently held that 
when Congress passed part of the 1991 Civil Rights Act to overturn another Court case, Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), Congress did not adopt the law regarding burden of 
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The Supreme Court’s second implied retaliation case in 2008, Gomez-
Perez v. Potter,186 involved a provision of the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)187 that addresses age discrimination 
against federal employees (as opposed to private-sector employees).188 
Section 15(a) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a), states that all employment 
decisions affecting federal employees or applicants who are at least 40 
years of age “shall be made free from any discrimination based on age.”189 
As with the other implied retaliation cases addressed so far, the Court 
decided that this general prohibition on discrimination included a claim 
for retaliation.190 The Gomez-Perez majority conducted a relatively cursory 
analysis: the ADEA contained general language banning discrimination 
based on age; age is a similar protected category to race and sex; the Court 
already implied retaliation claims from general language banning 
discrimination based on race and sex (in Sullivan and Jackson, 
respectively); therefore, an implied retaliation claim should be implied 
from the ADEA’s general anti-discriminatory language.191 
The majority’s quick syllogistic analysis and easy reliance on precedent 
belie a deeper problem with a claim for retaliation under §633a(a). This 
problem somewhat revisits the same issue the Section 1981 retaliation 
claim in CBOCS West confronted regarding the 1991 Civil Rights Act. That 
is, how should the Court interpret Congressional silence at a time when 
Congress included clear anti-retaliation provisions in other statutes?192 In 
Gomez-Perez, however, the circumstances surrounding Congressional 
passage of the federal government sections of the ADEA presented an 
                                                                                                                                     
proof in ADEA cases that existed prior to Price Waterhouse. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., ___ 
U.S. ____, 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2349 (2009). 
186 128 S. Ct. 1931 (2008). 
187 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. 
188 See 29 U.S.C. § 633a. 
189 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a). 
190 See Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1936. The plaintiff claimed that her employer retaliated against 
her for filing an age discrimination complaint. See id. at 1935. 
191 See id. at 1937. Justice Alito wrote the 6-3 decision. Chief Justice Roberts wrote a dissenting 
opinion joined in part by Justices Thomas and Scalia, see id. at 1943 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting), and 
Justice Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Scalia, see id. at 1951 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). The Court stated: 
Following the reasoning of Sullivan and Jackson, we interpret the ADEA federal-
sector provision's prohibition of “discrimination based on age” as likewise 
proscribing retaliation. The statutory language at issue here (“discrimination 
based on age”) is not materially different from the language at issue in Jackson 
(“’discrimination’ ” “ ‘on the basis of sex’ ”) and is the functional equivalent of 
the language at issue in Sullivan, see Jackson, supra, at 177, 125 S.Ct. 1497 
(describing Sullivan as involving “discrimination on the basis of race”). And the 
context in which the statutory language appears is the same in all three cases; 
that is, all three cases involve remedial provisions aimed at prohibiting 
discrimination. 
Id. 
192 See supra text accompanying notes 172-80. 
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even greater challenge to finding an implied claim for retaliation than the 
Court faced in either Jackson or CBOCS West.193  
When the ADEA originally passed in 1967, the Act applied only to the 
private sector and included both an anti-discrimination provision and a 
separate anti-retaliation provision.194 Seven years later, Congress passed 
the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974,195 which added 29 U.S.C. § 
633a to the ADEA to prevent age discrimination against most Executive 
Branch employees.196 However, Congress did not include a specific anti-
retaliation provision in the amendment covering federal workers—a 
distinct difference between the amendment and the original ADEA 
applicable to the private sector. Moreover, Congress clearly was aware of 
the ADEA’s original provisions protecting private-sector employees from 
discrimination and, separately, retaliation. As Chief Justice Roberts noted 
in dissent,197 the amendments made these separate private-sector 
provisions applicable to States and their political subdivisions, but 
Congress enacted the separate section 633a (without a distinct anti-
retaliation provision) to apply to the federal government.198 A further 
piece of evidence from the FLSA Amendments suggests that Congress 
deliberately chose not to include a separate anti-retaliation provision in 
the section of the ADEA applicable to federal employees. As part of the 
Amendments, Congress amended the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to 
extend the FLSA, including its anti-retaliation provision, to federal 
                                                 
193 See Charles Shanor, Employment Cases from the 2007-2008 Supreme Court Term, 24 LAB. LAW. 
147, 155-56 (2008) (noting that Gomez-Perez was a “harder retaliation case” than CBOCS West 
because the ADEA private-sector provision had an anti-retaliation provision and because the case 
presented a “weaker stare decisis argument”). 
194 See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 81 Stat. 602. Section 4(a)(1) of the Act, 
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), made it unlawful for an employer to “discriminate against any individual . . . 
because of such individual’s age.” Section 4(d), 29 U.S.C. § 623(d), prevented retaliation against any 
employee or applicant who “has opposed any practice made unlawful by this section, or because 
such individual . . . has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an 
investigation, proceeding, or litigation under” the ADEA. 
195 88 Stat. 74. 
196 See Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1944 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
197 See id. at 1946 (“Congress obviously had the private-sector ADEA provision prominently 
before it when it enacted § 633a, because the same bill that included § 633a also amended the 
private-sector provision.”) (citing §28(a)(2), 88 Stat. 74, which broadened the definition of 
“employer” in 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)). 
198 See id. at 1947. As the Chief Justice stated: 
Congress specifically chose in the FLSA Amendments to treat States and the 
Federal Government differently with respect to the ADEA itself. It subjected the 
former to the ADEA’s private-sector provision—including the express 
prohibition against retaliation in § 623(d)—while creating § 633a as a stand-alone 
prohibition against discrimination in federal employment, without an 
antiretaliation provision. This decision evinces a deliberate legislative choice not 
to extend those portions of the ADEA’s private-sector provisions that are not 
expressly included in § 633a . . . . 
Id. at 1947-48 (citations omitted). 
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employees.199 Again as Chief Justice Roberts argued in dissent, “Congress 
did not similarly subject the Federal Government to the express 
antiretaliation provision in the ADEA, strongly suggesting that this was a 
conscious choice.”200  
The majority, however, disagreed with Chief Justice Roberts regarding 
the meaning of the dissimilar structure utilized by the private-sector and 
the federal-sector provisions. In response to his criticism, the majority 
again relied heavily on Sullivan, as it did in CBOCS West. The majority 
claimed that when Congress enacted a “broad, general ban” on age 
discrimination, “Congress was presumably familiar with Sullivan and had 
reason to expect that this ban would be interpreted ‘in conformity’ with 
that precedent.”201 Therefore, the fact that separate provisions of the 
ADEA addressed retaliation differently “does not provide a sufficient 
reason to depart from the reasoning of Sullivan and Jackson.”202 
2. Explicit Protection: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
The year after Jackson, the Supreme Court turned to the explicit anti-
retaliation provision of Title VII. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway 
Co. v. White203 required the Court to determine the type of adverse action 
that qualifies as retaliation by an employer against an employee.204 In 
many ways, the case provided a mirror image of Jackson. While Jackson 
required the Court to find retaliation protection as an implicit part of a 
broad anti-discrimination provision,205 Burlington Northern emphasized 
that protection from discrimination differs from protection from 
retaliation.206 For Jackson, retaliation was part of discrimination; for 
Burlington Northern, retaliation required a separate analysis. Yet, in both 
cases, the Court found in favor of protecting employees from retaliation. 
The plaintiff in Burlington Northern claimed that her employer had 
retaliated against her for complaining about gender discrimination by 
taking two actions: first reassigning her to a position with less prestige 
and more arduous responsibilities, and then later suspending her without 
pay for 37 days (although the company later reinstated her with back 
pay).207 To determine whether these actions violated Title VII’s anti-
                                                 
199 See id. at 1947 (citing to FLSA Amendments, § 6(a)(2), 88 Stat. 58, which “explicitly subjected 
federal employers to the FLSA’s express antiretaliation provision, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3)”). 
200 Id. 
201 See Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1941; see also id. at 1942 n.6 (using same rationale to address the 
argument related to Congress’ amendment of the Fair Labor Standards Act to include an explicit 
anti-retaliation provision applicable to federal employees). 
202 See id. at 1941. 
203 548 U.S. 53 (2006).  
204 See id. at 59. 
205 See Jackson, 544 U.S. at 174. 
206 See Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 62-63. 
207 See id. at 59, 71-72. 
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retaliation provision, the Court had to determine the scope of the statute’s 
provision barring an employer from “discriminat[ing] against” an 
employee for opposing any practice made unlawful by Title VII or for 
participating in a Title VII proceeding or investigation.208 
Several Courts of Appeals had determined that Title VII’s anti-
retaliation provision should be read to prohibit only adverse actions 
related to employment, which would be the same standard that courts 
apply to actions that may violate Title VII’s anti-discrimination 
provision.209 Others had taken an even more restrictive approach by 
limiting actionable retaliation to “ultimate employment actions,” such as 
“hiring, granting leave, discharging promoting, and compensating.”210 
The Supreme Court, however, determined that Title VII required a 
broader interpretation to prohibit not only employment-related 
retaliation, but also actions unrelated to employment that could have an 
impact on an employee’s willingness to report discrimination.211  
The Court based its holding on the language and the purpose of Title 
VII’s anti-retaliation provision.212 First, the language of Title VII’s anti-
retaliation provision differs from the statute’s anti-discrimination 
provision. Title VII prohibits discrimination by prohibiting specific actions 
related to employment: failing or refusing to hire or discharge, 
discriminating with respect to an employee’s compensation, terms, 
conditions or privileges of employment, or limiting employment 
opportunities.213 The anti-retaliation provision, however, does not have 
such limiting language. It prohibits an employer generally from 
“discriminat[ing]” against employees or applicants in retaliation.214 
                                                 
208 See id. at 56-57.  
209 See id. at 60 (citing Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry., Co. v. White, 364 F.3d 789 (6th Cir. 2004); 
Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 866 (4th Cir. 2001); Robinson v. Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 
1300 (3rd Cir. 1997)). 
210 Id. (quoting Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) and citing Manning v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir. 
1997)). 
211 Id. at 57; see also id. at 67. The Court decided in favor of the employee with a 9-0 vote. Justice 
Breyer wrote the majority opinion joined by seven other Justices. Justice Alito filed an opinion 
concurring in the judgment only. See id. at 73 (Alito, J. concurring). 
212 See id. at 62-63. 
213 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). The provision reads: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to 
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for 
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of 
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, 
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
 Id. (emphasis added). 
214 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The provision reads:  
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate 
against any of his employees or applicants for employment ... because he has 
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Second, the Court found that Congress intended these linguistic 
differences to make a “legal difference” because the two provisions have 
different purposes as well.215 Because the “substantive” anti-
discrimination provision seeks to prevent discrimination in the workplace, 
Congress needed only to prohibit acts related to employment. However, 
the anti-retaliation provision aims to prevent discrimination by blocking 
an employer from interfering with an employee’s effort to enforce the 
statute’s substantive anti-discrimination objectives.216 To support this 
objective, Title VII necessarily must prevent a broader range of employer 
actions because of the various non-employment ways in which an 
employer could deter employees from “[m]aintaining unfettered access to 
statutory remedial mechanisms.”217 
Finally, the Court noted that, although the actionable retaliatory 
conduct was broader than discriminatory conduct, it was not limitless. 
The Court said that “it is important to separate significant from trivial 
harms.”218 Thus, Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision covers all employer 
actions “that would have been materially adverse to a reasonable 
employee or job applicant.”219 By “materially adverse,” the Court meant 
that the employer action “could well dissuade a reasonable worker from 
making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”220 This objective 
standard recognizes that “petty slights, minor annoyances, and simple 
lack of good manners” would not be actionable because they would be 
unlikely to deter employees from complaining to the EEOC about 
discrimination.221  
Using this standard, the Court found that both the retaliatory 
reassignment and the unpaid suspension imposed by the employer in this 
case violated Title VII because these actions would likely dissuade an 
employee from bringing a charge of discrimination.222 Interestingly, as 
Justice Alito noted in his concurrence, the Court might not have had to 
issue as broad a holding in order to find that the employer’s conduct in 
this specific case violated Title VII.223 Even Courts of Appeals that limited 
the anti-retaliation protection to employment-related action likely would 
                                                                                                                                     
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this 
subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated 
in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter. 
 Id. (emphasis added). 
215 See Burlington Northern, 544 U.S. at 62-63. 
216 See id. at 63. 
217 Id. at 64 (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
218 Id. at 68. 
219 Id. at 57; see also id. at 67. 
220 Id. at 57. 
221 Id. at 68. 
222 Id. at 70-73. 
223 Id. at 79-80 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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have found that the employer action in this case satisfied that standard.224 
Nevertheless, in the face of significant differences among the Circuits as to 
the scope of this provision, the Court decided to clarify the issue by 
requiring a standard more protective of employees. 
The Supreme Court’s most recent retaliation opinion, issued in 2009, 
returned the Court to Title VII and its explicit anti-retaliation provision. 
Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, Tenn.225 considered 
whether Title VII’s retaliation provision protected an employee who 
participated in an employer’s internal investigation of a sexual harassment 
complaint.226 The employee had answered her employer’s questions and 
identified several alleged instances of harassment that she had 
witnessed.227 
Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision protects two types of conduct. 
First, it prohibits retaliation against an employee who “has opposed” 
violations of Title VII.228 Second, the statute protects an employee who 
“has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an 
investigation, proceeding, or hearing” under Title VII.229 The Crawford 
plaintiff argued that both Title VII’s “opposition” clause as well as its 
“participation” clause prohibited retaliation against her based on her 
conduct during her employer’s internal investigation.230 
The Court evaluated the claim only under the opposition clause and 
determined that the employee’s actions during the investigation 
constituted protected conduct.231 The Sixth Circuit had viewed the 
plaintiff’s conduct as insufficient because it believed Title VII required 
“active, consistent ‘opposing’ activities to warrant . . . protection against 
retaliation.”232 Relying primarily on the “ordinary” meaning of the term 
“oppose” found in the dictionary, however, the Supreme Court 
disagreed.233 As with the Court’s other recent retaliation cases, this 
conclusion is debatable; for example, the Circuit Courts of Appeal had 
issued conflicting opinions regarding the extent to which Title VII’s anti-
retaliation provision requires “active” opposition.234 Moreover, the Court 
                                                 
224 See id. 
225 129 S. Ct. 846 (2009). 
226 See id. at 849. 
227 See id. 
228 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
229 Id. 
230 See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 850. 
231 See id. at 853. 
232 See id. at 851 (quoting Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, Tenn., 
211 Fed. Appx. 373, 376 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Bell v. Safety Grooving & Grinding, LP, 107 Fed. 
Appx. 607, 610 (6th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
233 See id. at 850 (citing Webster’s New International Dictionary 1710 (2d ed. 1958) for the 
proposition that “RESIST frequently implies more active striving than OPPOSE”). 
234 Compare Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, Tenn., 211 Fed. Appx. 
373, 376 (6th Cir. 2006) and McNorton v. Ga. Dep’t of Transp., 2007 WL 4481431, at *14 (N.D. Ga. 
2007) (holding that an employee’s cooperation with internal investigation did not constitute 
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could have chosen numerous other definitions of “oppose” that seem to 
require much more active and overt resistance.235 
Ultimately, the Court reasoned that not protecting employees like the 
plaintiff would undermine the effectiveness of the scheme the Court had 
implemented in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth236 and Faragher v. Boca 
Raton,237 which encouraged employer internal investigations of sexual 
harassment claims.238 Thus, according to the Court, Title VII’s opposition 
clause goes beyond active opposition to protect any form of 
communication to the employer in which the employee communicates a 
belief that the employer has violated Title VII.239  
B. First Amendment Protection 
In the midst of this series of cases addressing statutory anti-retaliation 
protection, the Court also addressed the breadth of protection the First 
Amendment provides to government employees. In Garcetti v. Ceballos,240 
the Court significantly limited the circumstances in which an employee 
may claim protection from retaliation. The 5-4 Garcetti majority held that 
the First Amendment does not protect employees from discipline related 
to speech that was a part of an employee’s official duties.241 
The Garcetti plaintiff, a deputy district attorney, informed his 
supervisors in a memo that a sheriff’s affidavit being relied upon in a 
criminal case contained “serious misrepresentations.”242 After a “heated” 
meeting between the plaintiff and his supervisors about the plaintiff’s 
conclusions, the supervisors decided to proceed with the prosecution 
despite the plaintiff’s protests.243 Ultimately, the criminal defendant called 
the plaintiff as a witness, and he reiterated his misgivings about the 
sheriff’s affidavit.244 After the hearing, the plaintiff claimed the district 
attorney’s office violated the First Amendment by retaliating against him 
because of his memo.245 
                                                                                                                                     
opposition conduct) with McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 262 (7th Cir. 1996) (upholding 
protection of employee’s “passive” opposition to discrimination). 
235 See, e.g., McNorton, 2007 WL 4481431, at *13 (noting recent dictionary definitions that define 
oppose with active terms); Br. for Resp., Crawford (No. 06-1595), available at 2008 WL 2066116, at *27 
(same). 
236 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
237 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
238 See, e.g., Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
239 See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 851. 
240 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
241 See id. at 421. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito. Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer each filed a 
dissent, and Justice Souter filed a third dissent joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg. 
242 Id. at 414. 
243 See id.  
244 See id. at 414-15. 
245 See id. at 415. 
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In addressing the claim, the Court initially provided an exhaustive 
review of its First Amendment jurisprudence and reiterated that it 
required a delicate balancing of the employee’s interest in speaking out as 
a citizen and the government employer’s interest in operational 
efficiency.246 Importantly, the Court also identified a third interest that 
must be balanced: the “public's interest in receiving the well-informed 
views of government employees engaging in civic discussion.”247 As 
summarized by the Court, its decisions “have sought both to promote the 
individual and societal interests that are served when employees speak as 
citizens on matters of public concern and to respect the needs of 
government employers attempting to perform their important public 
functions.”248 
Within this framework, the Court found that the employee in Garcetti 
acted pursuant to his job duties, which the Court interpreted to mean that 
he was speaking as an employee rather than as a citizen.249 According to 
the Court, this distinction meant that the government employer had more 
discretion to control his speech and to discipline him if the employer 
found the speech to be too disruptive or inaccurate.250 When the 
“employee is simply performing his or her job duties,” the Constitution 
does not require the same “delicate balancing” necessary when a 
government employee speaks as a citizen on a matter of public concern.251 
The Court seemed attuned to at least one likely consequence of its 
holding: that government employees will report misconduct less 
frequently. Yet, despite recognizing that “[e]xposing governmental 
inefficiency and misconduct is a matter of considerable significance,” the 
Court ultimately asserted that encouraging employees to blow the whistle 
was not necessarily the Constitution’s job.252 Instead, the Court pointed to 
other potential safeguards, such as an employer’s “internal policies and 
procedures that are receptive to employee criticism,” a “powerful network 
of legislative enactments-such as whistle-blower protection laws and labor 
codes-available to those who seek to expose wrongdoing,” and attorney 
rules of conduct.253 
                                                 
246 See id. at 417-19. 
247 Id. at 419; see also San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (per curiam) (“Were [public 
employees] not able to speak on [the operation of their employers], the community would be 
deprived of informed opinions on important public issues. The interest at stake is as much the 
public's interest in receiving informed opinion as it is the employee's own right to disseminate it” 
(citation omitted)); United States v. Treasury Employees, 513 U.S., 454, 470 (1995) (“The large-scale 
disincentive to Government employees' expression also imposes a significant burden on the 
public's right to read and hear what the employees would otherwise have written and said.”). 
248 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 419-20 (citations omitted) (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572-73). 
249 See id. at 421. 
250 See id. at 422-23. 
251 Id. at 423. 
252 See id. at 426 (“Our precedents do not support the existence of a constitutional cause of 
action behind every statement a public employee makes in the course of doing his or her job.”). 
253 Id. at 425. 
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Four justices dissented, writing three separate dissenting opinions. 
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg joined Justice Souter’s dissent, which 
argued for a different sort of balancing that placed more emphasis on 
society’s interest in government employee speech. Although Justice Souter 
recognized a government employer’s need to manage its work force, he 
asserted that society’s interest “in addressing official wrongdoing and 
threats to health and safety can outweigh the government [employer]'s 
stake in the efficient implementation of policy.”254 Thus, when an 
employee speaks on a matter of “unusual importance and satisfies high 
standards of responsibility in the way he does it,” the fact that the speech 
related to the employee’s job duties should not automatically exclude 
protection.255 Justice Souter defined matters of “unusual importance” to 
include “official dishonesty, deliberately unconstitutional action, other 
serious wrongdoing, or threats to health and safety.”256 Justice Stevens 
wrote a separate dissent in which he called the majority’s views 
“misguided” because constitutional protection should not turn on 
whether an employee’s words fell within the employee’s job 
description.257 Finally, Justice Breyer’s dissent argued that the majority’s 
“job duty” rule was too categorical, and that some limited First 
Amendment protection should still be provided to speech arising out of 
an employee’s professional and constitutional obligations.258 Justice 
Breyer, however, labeled as “too broad” Justice Souter’s exception for 
employee speech on “matters of unusual importance,” and declared that 
the exception caused too much judicial interference in government 
employment matters.259 
C. The Anti-Retaliation Principle and the Recent Cases 
Taken together, the six recent Court opinions dealing with retaliation 
appear untethered to any consistent judicial philosophy. In Jackson, the 
Court asserted that protection from retaliation was part of a statute’s 
general anti-discrimination protection,260 while in Burlington Northern the 
Court upheld broad retaliation protection because it was different than a 
statute’s discrimination protection.261 The importance of stare decisis 
controlled the outcome of CBOCS West and Gomez-Perez,262 while in 
                                                 
254 Id. at 428 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
255 Id. at 435. 
256 Id. 
257 Id. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
258 Id. at 446-47 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
259 See id. at 448-49. 
260 See Jackson, 544 U.S. at 174. 
261 See Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 62-63. 
262 See CBOCS West, 128 S. Ct. at 1955; Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1937. 
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Jackson the Court ignored important precedent.263 The Court implied 
broad retaliation protection when statutes were silent,264 yet refused to 
imply narrower protection when examining the First Amendment.265 
Although the Court typically emphasizes strict statutory interpretation 
and Congressional intent, it broadly interpreted anti-retaliation statutory 
provisions and examined Congressional purpose in Crawford and 
Burlington Northern.266 In Crawford, the Court generously construed the 
definition of the word “oppose,”267 while in Burlington Northern the Court 
interpreted the phrase “discriminate against” to include actions taken 
against employees that are unrelated to employment.268 Most 
fundamentally, of course, the Court expanded retaliation protection in the 
five statutory cases and greatly restricted it in the constitutional case. 
The recent cases also present numerous surprises when viewed more 
broadly against the Court’s non-retaliation cases. First, the employee won 
five of the six retaliation cases, a rarity for this Court that often narrowly 
construes employee protections in other contexts. For example, most 
recently, the Court held that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
of 1967269 required a substantially higher causation standard than 
previously had been thought to apply.270 Additionally, in the last few 
years, the Court severely limited the statute of limitations for 
discrimination cases,271 restricted the application of the constitutional 
Equal Protection Clause to public employees,272 and undermined Title 
VII’s protection from disparate impact discrimination.273 Although 
numbers do not tell the whole story,274 the win-loss record for employees 
                                                 
263 See generally Jackson, 544 U.S. at 171-84 (implying a right of action for Title IX, but not 
mentioning Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), the Supreme Court’s seminal case on implied rights of 
action); id. at 177-78 (distinguishing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001), the case in which the 
Court decided not to imply a disparate impact right of action under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, 78 Stat. 252, a sister statute to Title IX, see id. at 281). 
264 See CBOCS West, 128 S. Ct. at 1954 (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 
1935 (interpreting 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a)); Jackson, 544 U.S. at 173 (interpreting 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)). 
265 See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421. 
266 See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 850 (interpreting Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3); Burlington 
Northern, 548 U.S. at 56-57 (interpreting Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3). 
267 See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 850. 
268 See Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 56-57. 
269 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. 
270 See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., ___ U.S. ____, 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2351-52 (2009). 
271 See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 638-43 (2007). Congress 
statutorily overturned this decision immediately after President Obama’s inauguration. See Lilly 
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009). 
272 See Engquist v. Oregon Dep't of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591, 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2156-57 (2008). 
273 See Ricci v. DeStefano, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664-65 (2009). 
274 See Harkavy, supra note 4, at 2 (“For those who insist on keeping a scorecard, employees 
appeared at first blush to fare better this [2007] term than last…. [However, w]hen viewed more 
analytically than anecdotally, there was actually no such discernible shift in the Court's orientation 
as an employer-friendly forum.“); Shanor, supra note 193, at 154 (“If this is a more conservative 
Court, it did not show it in [CBOCS West].”). 
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in retaliation cases conflicts with the conventional wisdom that this Court 
generally favors business interests in employment cases.275 
Second, many of the recent retaliation cases undermine long-standing 
Supreme Court precedent. In particular, the implied retaliation cases 
ignore the Court’s traditional reluctance to imply a right of action when a 
statute does not explicitly provide for one. In the last few decades, the 
Supreme Court has limited the ability of federal courts to imply private 
rights of action by abandoning inquiry into a statute’s purpose.276 Rather, 
federal courts must utilize basic statutory interpretation tools to examine 
whether Congress specifically intended to create a right of action.277  
Yet, in the face of this precedent, the Court went out of its way to 
permit three claims for retaliation when no anti-retaliation provision 
existed.278 As mentioned above, although the reliance on Sullivan may 
have been appropriate in Jackson to discern Congressional intent when it 
enacted Title IX, this rationale loses its force when applied to Section 1981 
in CBOCS West and the ADEA in Gomez-Perez. Congress created the 
statutory language at issue in both of these later cases during a period 
when it also enacted numerous statutes with very specific anti-retaliation 
provisions. It is unlikely that Congress relied on Sullivan’s vague holding 
in 1974 when it enacted the ADEA or in 1991 when it amended the Civil 
Rights Act, because Congress also included specific anti-retaliation 
language in other legislation during that time. Moreover, when it enacted 
the ADEA and the 1991 Amendments’ anti-discriminatory language of 
                                                 
275 See, e.g., Christine Cooper, Employment Cases from the 2006-2007 Supreme Court Term, 23 LAB. 
LAW. 223, 224 (2008) (“Of course the Court has tilted to the right”); Michael Selmi, The Supreme 
Court’s 2006-2007 Term Employment Law Cases: A Quiet But Revealing Term, 11 EMP. R. & EMP. POL’Y J. 
219, 220 (2007) (“The other patently obvious lesson this [2006-2007] term provided is that this is a 
tough time for plaintiffs in the employment context.”); Ramona Paetzold, Supreme Court’s 2005-
2006 Term Employment Law Cases: Do New Justices Imply New Direction?, 10 EMP. R. & EMP. POL’Y J. 
303, at 348 (2006) (noting that after the 2005-2006 term, “preliminary indicia of a new conservatism 
do exist”); Linda Greenhouse, Justices Express Skepticism in a Discrimination Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 
2007, at A26; see also Robert Barnes, Decisions Indicate Supreme Court Moved Rightward This Term, 
WASH. POST (July 1, 2009), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/06/30/AR2009063004170.html?nav=emailpage (noting after the 2008-
2009 term that the “path” of the Court is “clear: a patient and steady move to the right led by Chief 
Justice John G. Roberts”). 
276 See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
277 See id.; Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979) (“While 
some opinions of the Court have placed considerable emphasis upon the desirability of implying 
private rights of action in order to provide remedies thought to effectuate the purposes of a given 
statute, what must ultimately be determined is whether Congress intended to create the private 
remedy asserted, as our recent decisions have made clear.” (citation omitted)); Karahalios v. Nat'l 
Fed'n of Fed. Employees, 489 U.S. 527, 536 (1989) (“Congress undoubtedly was aware from our 
cases such as Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975), that the Court had 
departed from its prior standard for resolving a claim urging that an implied statutory cause of 
action should be recognized, and that such issues were being resolved by a straightforward inquiry 
into whether Congress intended to provide a private cause of action.”). 
278 See, e.g., Lynn Ridgeway Zehrt, Retaliation’s Changing Landscape, 20 GEO. MASON UNIV. CIVIL 
R. J. 143, 179-80 (2010). 
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Section 1981, Congress certainly was aware that the Court required 
specific language in order to recognize a private cause of action.279 This 
legislative reality significantly undermines the Court’s conclusion that 
Congress actually constructed a general anti-discrimination provision 
without an anti-retaliation clause because it was relying on the Court’s 
Sullivan opinion released years before.280 At a minimum, the fact that the 
Court’s arguments present substantial problems should make 
commentators question why the Court worked so hard to imply rights of 
action for retaliation after years of reluctance to do so in any other case. 
 Third, for a Supreme Court that prides itself on closely adhering to 
statutory language when interpreting the law,281 the recent Title VII 
retaliation cases demonstrate the Court’s willingness to examine 
Congressional purpose in addition to statutory language. For example, 
Title VII itself gives little indication what exactly it prevents employers 
from doing in retaliation: the statute prohibits only “discrimination.”282 
Before Burlington Northern, many lower courts had held that this provision 
should be read in pari materia with Title VII’s anti-discrimination 
provision; in other words that they both address the same type of 
employer action taken towards employees in the employment setting.283 
The Supreme Court, however, refused to accept this standard canon of 
statutory interpretation. After a cursory look at the differences between 
the specific language in the anti-discrimination provision and the general 
language in the anti-retaliation provision, the Court argued that Congress’ 
purpose when it enacted the anti-retaliation provision should guide the 
interpretation of the statute.284 Similarly, Title VII’s use of the term 
“oppose” does not have any inherent meaning as to the level of action 
required to “oppose” unlawful conduct. The Court’s majority and 
concurrence presented dueling dictionary definitions to support their 
respective positions,285 but ultimately each had to fall back on their own 
                                                 
279 See Karahalios, 489 U.S. at 536. 
280 Accord Harkavy, supra note 4, at 10 (noting in Gomez-Perez the “undeniable anomaly that 
Congress provided an express remedy for retaliation against private employees, but did not do so 
in similar terms for federal employees”). 
281 See Arlington Central School District v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 303-04 (2006); Exxon Mobil 
Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 567-71 (2005); Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 
359-60 (2005); see also Humphries v. CBOCS West, Inc., 474 F.3d, 410 (7th Cir. 2007) (Easterbrook, J., 
dissenting in part) (noting that these cases indicate the Supreme Court “insists that statutory 
language be followed even if inconvenient or jarring”). 
282 See Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
283 See, e.g., White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry., Co., 364 F.3d 789, 799-800 (6th Cir. 2004); 
Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 866 (4th Cir. 2001); Robinson v. Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 
1300 (3rd Cir. 1997)). 
284 See Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 62-64 (“[P]urpose reinforces what language already 
indicates, namely, that the anti-retaliation provision, unlike the substantive provision, is not 
limited to discriminatory actions that affect the terms and conditions of employment.”) 
285 See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 850; id. at 853-54 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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view of the provision’s purpose as well as the practical consequences of the 
various interpretations of the word presented by each side.286 
Commentators have had difficulty following the twists and turns. 
Some commentators assert that the Court has returned to an earlier era in 
which its goal is to divine Congressional intent and advance Congress’ 
purposes through the Court’s interpretation of statutes.287 Others 
highlight and analyze the Court’s use of various canons of statutory 
interpretation and judicially-created legal fictions.288 In a thoughtful article 
after the Jackson opinion in 2005, Professor Deborah Brake provided a 
well-reasoned argument that protection from retaliation was an implied 
part of protection from discrimination.289 
Other commentators view the decisions as little more than outcome-
driven policy determinations in favor of retaliation protection; however, 
they cannot agree on the meaning of the outcomes.290 For example, 
Professor Richard Carlson has argued that the Court’s recent statutory 
retaliation cases do not necessarily “signal a consistently sympathetic 
judicial view” regarding retaliation against employees, in large part 
because they all hue closely to specific statutory language.291 Indeed, he 
dismissed these cases as “episodic expressions of support” that “belie a 
persistent ambivalence” towards employees who suffer retaliation when 
they advance the interest of the larger public good.292 In contrast, Daniel 
Westman, a prominent practitioner and author,293 asserted that the Court 
has been pro-employee in retaliation cases because “[j]udges do not like 
the idea that witnesses are going to be intimidated and that translates into 
the workplace.”294  
                                                 
286 See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 852-53; id. at 854-55 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
287 See Derek W. Black, The Mysteriously Reappearing Cause of Action: The Court’s Expanded 
Concept of Intentional Gender and Race Discrimination in Federally Funded Programs, 67 MD. L. REV. 358, 
394-95 (2008) (citing to Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979)); cf. Shanor, supra note 
193, at 172 (noting that the Court in CBOCS West and Gomez-Perez “moved away from textual 
statutory construction to more contextual or pragmatist approaches to statutory interpretation”). 
288 See Leading Cases, Retaliation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 445, 451-55 (2008) (asserting that the 
opinions in Gomez-Perez use rhetoric that appears to examine legislative intent but that in reality 
utilize judicially-created legal fictions); Zehrt, supra note 278, at 153 (analyzing the three recent 
implied retaliation cases and arguing that the court “has eschewed any reliance on public policy 
and has chosen instead to base its decisions solely on statutory construction”). 
289 See Brake, supra note 7, at 21-22.  
290 See Leading Cases, Retaliation as Sex Discrimination, 119 HARV. L. REV. 357, 365-66 (2005) 
(discussing Jackson and noting that “[t]o an optimist, Jackson is a valiant attempt by the judiciary to 
patch an unfortunate statutory hole. To a pessimist, the case is a contemptible example of tenuous 
reasoning chasing a desired policy outcome”). 
291 See Carlson, supra note 7, at 244. Moreover, Professor Carlson contrasts the decisions in 
Jackson and Burlington Northern with Garcetti. See id. 
292 Id. at 240. 
293 See generally WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 118. 
294 Marcia Coyle, Term’s Five Key Bias Decisions Were Mixed, NAT’L L.J. (July 6, 2009), available at 
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202431973694&Terms_five_key_bias_decisi
ons_were_mixed_&slreturn=1 (quoting Westman). Of course, Westman’s conclusion does not 
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Perhaps these decisions simply present examples of the Court deciding 
the narrow issues of the cases before it: whether statutory language 
contains an implied right of action or covers certain actions. Admittedly, 
in each decision, the Court engaged in a discreet and nuanced 
examination of the specific statutory language and structure involved in 
each individual case. Indeed, to some the cases required only “careful 
scrutiny of the particular provision in question,”295 which would keep 
with the Court’s historic view limiting the instances in which it would 
read a statutory provision broadly or to include an implied right of action. 
However, a more comprehensive explanation is possible. Placing these 
cases in the context of the Court’s other retaliation jurisprudence provides 
a perspective that brings consistency and a sense of order to these 
seemingly counter-intuitive results. When placed in this context, one 
common theme can be discerned throughout the recent retaliation cases: 
the Anti-Retaliation Principle. The Court recognized that enforcing the 
law requires encouraging employees to provide information about 
corporate misconduct. Anti-retaliation protection means enhanced law 
enforcement, which the Court for fifty years has valued more than other 
competing concerns. Indeed, in several ways, the recent retaliation cases 
exemplify the Court’s long-standing acceptance of and adherence to the 
same Anti-Retaliation Principle that the Court has utilized consistently in 
the past. 
As an initial matter, the implied retaliation cases rely heavily on the 
holding of Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.,296 a case that, as mentioned 
above, relies upon the Anti-Retaliation Principle to support its holding 
that Section 1982 incorporates an implied right of action for retaliation.297 
Indeed, all three of the recent implied retaliation cases pay homage to 
Sullivan’s reference to the Principle.298  
But, more than simply adopting Sullivan, the Court reinvigorated the 
Anti-Retaliation Principle through these recent cases. Again, the Anti-
Retaliation Principle recognizes that law enforcement depends upon 
employees blowing the whistle on illegal conduct—even if those 
employees are not the victims of that conduct. In order to encourage them 
to come forward, the law must protect them from retaliation. Notably, like 
Sullivan, two of the three recent implied retaliation cases—Jackson and 
                                                                                                                                     
explain the Garcetti Court’s reluctance to protect a person who was both an employee and a 
witness. 
295 Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1951 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 1939 (Alito, J.) 
(“Jackson did not hold that Title IX prohibits retaliation because the Court concluded as a policy 
matter that such claims are important. Instead, the holding in Jackson was based on an 
interpretation of the ‘text of Title IX.’” (quoting Jackson, 544 U.S., at 178)). 
296 396 U.S. 229 (1969). 
297 See discussion supra Part I; see also Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 237 (finding that if an individual 
could be “punished for trying to vindicate the rights of minorities protected by § 1982,” then 
“[s]uch a sanction would give impetus to the perpetuation of racial restrictions on property”). 
298 See Jackson, 544 U.S. at 180; CBOCS West, 128 S. Ct. at 1955; Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1936. 
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CBOCS West—involved third-party reporters of illegal discrimination.299 
The Jackson plaintiff reported inequities in the girls’ basketball program300 
and the CBOCS West plaintiff reported alleged discrimination against a co-
worker.301 The Jackson Court made it clear that the victim of retaliation can 
be (and often would be) different than the victim of the underlying 
discrimination.302 For Title IX specifically, the Court found that Title IX’s 
enforcement depended upon complaints, particularly from insiders with 
first-hand knowledge about violations, such as teachers and coaches.303 
Thus, the Jackson Court explicitly adopted the Anti-Retaliation 
Principle:  
 
If recipients [of federal education funds] were permitted to 
retaliate freely, individuals who witness discrimination 
would be loath to report it, and all manner of Title IX 
violations might go unremedied as a result. . . . Reporting 
incidents of discrimination is integral to Title IX enforcement 
and would be discouraged if retaliation against those who 
report went unpunished. Indeed, if retaliation were not 
prohibited, Title IX's enforcement scheme would unravel. . . . 
Without protection from retaliation, individuals who 
witness discrimination would likely not report it, . . . and the 
underlying discrimination would go unremedied.”304  
 
This adoption paved the way for the subsequent implied retaliation cases 
to do the same for similar reasons. The CBOCS West Court upheld a 
retaliation claim for Section 1981 in part because its sister statute, Section 
1982, was held by Sullivan to provide “protection from retaliation for 
reasons related to the enforcement of the express statutory right.”305 
Although the Anti-Retaliation Principle is not as explicit in Gomez-Perez,306 
the Court did reject the government employer’s argument that protection 
                                                 
299 See Jackson, 544 U.S. at 171; CBOCS West, 128 S. Ct. at 1954; Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 237. 
300 See Jackson, 544 U.S. at 171. 
301 See CBOCS West, 129 S. Ct. at 1954. 
302 See Jackson, 544 U.S. at 179-80. 
303 See id. at 181 (“[T]eachers and coaches such as Jackson are often in the best position to 
vindicate the rights of their students because they are better able to identify discrimination and 
bring it to the attention of administrators. Indeed, sometimes adult employees are ‘”the only 
effective adversar[ies]’’’ of discrimination in schools.”) (quoting Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 237 (citing 
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 259 (1953))).  
304 Id. at 180-81. 
305 CBOCS West, 129 S. Ct. at 1958 (emphasis in original). 
306 The Court actually denied that it was making any policy-oriented determination in Jackson 
when it mentioned the important role of teachers and students in reporting illegal discrimination. 
See Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1939. The Court claimed it was merely responding to an argument 
made in Jackson that “even if even if Title IX was held to permit some retaliation claims, only a 
‘victim of the discrimination’-and not third parties-should be allowed to assert such a claim.” See id. 
(quoting Jackson, 544 U.S. at 179-82). 
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from retaliation is not necessary because third parties are not necessary to 
identify age discrimination and report it.307  
The Title VII cases also adopted the Anti-Retaliation Principle by 
broadly interpreting the statute’s express anti-retaliation provision. First, 
in Burlington Northern, the Court reiterated that the provision prevents 
employers “from interfering (through retaliation) with an employee’s 
efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act’s basic guarantees.”308 
In short, the “primary purpose” of the provision is to maintain 
“unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms.”309 Because of this 
purpose, the Court held that the provision should be interpreted broadly 
so that employers would be deterred from retaliating against employees 
who might report wrongdoing.310 Citing back to the Court’s first 
expression of the Anti-Retaliation Principle in Mitchell, the Court in 
Burlington Northern explicitly relied upon the Principle again: 
 
Title VII depends for its enforcement upon the cooperation 
of employees who are willing to file complaints and act as 
witnesses. “Plainly, effective enforcement could thus only be 
expected if employees felt free to approach officials with 
their grievances.” Interpreting the anti-retaliation provision 
to provide broad protection from retaliation helps assure the 
cooperation upon which accomplishment of the Act's 
primary objective depends.311  
 
Even when the Court declined to consider “petty slights, minor 
annoyances, and simple lack of good manners” to be actionable 
retaliation, the Anti-Retaliation Principle guided the Court’s rationale. 
Allowing such de minimus harms would not prevent “unfettered access” to 
Title VII’s remedial mechanisms because those trivial acts would not 
reasonably deter an employee from reporting discrimination.312 By 
focusing on the Anti-Retaliation Principle—i.e., enhancing law 
enforcement by encouraging employees to blow the whistle on 
illegalities—the Court limited actionable retaliatory acts to those that 
“could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a 
charge of discrimination.”313  
                                                 
307 See id. at 1938-39. 
308 Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 63. 
309 Id. at 64 (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
310 See id. 
311 Id. at 67 (quoting Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960)) (citation 
omitted). 
312 Id. at 68. 
313 Id. at 57; see also id. at 68. 
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The Court even modified its seemingly objective perspective on which 
actions would be “material.” By permitting some attention to be paid to 
whether an action would dissuade a reasonable person “in the plaintiff’s 
position,”314 the Court allowed for the introduction of individualized 
factors that might dissuade one type of person but not another from 
reporting. This permissible subjectivity highlights the importance of 
encouraging employees to report misconduct. Ultimately, although the 
Court wanted to “screen out trivial conduct,” its focus was on the Anti-
Retaliation Principle: preventing “those acts that are likely to dissuade 
employees from complaining or assisting in complaints about 
discrimination.”315 
The second Title VII case, Crawford, also emphasized the importance of 
the Anti-Retaliation Principle because of the Court’s recognition of the 
important role employee whistleblowers play in enforcing Title VII. As in 
Sullivan, Jackson, and CBOCS West, the plaintiff in Crawford was more of a 
reporter of discrimination than a victim asserting her own rights.316 Indeed, 
the Court made explicit its understanding that employees who report 
discrimination against others may face retaliation even when the 
whistleblower was not personally discriminated against.317  
As important, after its discussion of various dictionary meanings of the 
word “oppose,” the Crawford Court focused on the primary policy 
justification for protecting employees who participate in internal 
corporate investigations. This policy rationale involved yet another 
restatement of the Anti-Retaliation Principle: 
 
If it were clear law that an employee who reported 
discrimination in answering an employer's questions could 
be penalized with no remedy, prudent employees would 
have a good reason to keep quiet about Title VII offenses 
against themselves or against others. This is no imaginary 
horrible given the documented indications that “[f]ear of 
retaliation is the leading reason why people stay silent 
instead of voicing their concerns about bias and 
discrimination.”318 
 
                                                 
314 Id. at 69-70. 
315 Id. at 70. 
316 See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 849. The plaintiff actually suffered as a victim of sexual 
harassment, but reported her supervisor’s illegal conduct only during an investigation of 
unspecified rumors regarding sexual harassment by the supervisor. See id. 
317 See id. at 853 n.3 (“[E]mployees will often face retaliation not for opposing discrimination 
they themselves face, but for reporting discrimination suffered by others. Thus, they are not 
‘victims’ of anything until they are retaliated against. . . .”). 
318 Id. at 852 (quoting Brake, supra note 7, at 20). 
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Therefore, the five recent statutory retaliation cases reflect the same 
three premises supporting the Anti-Retaliation Principle that the Court 
has utilized for almost fifty years. First, the Court recognized that 
employees often have the best information about wrongdoing committed 
by an employer—a fact underscored by the plaintiffs in these cases, two of 
whom reported illegal conduct that was not directed at them.319 Second, as 
Crawford, Burlington Northern, and Jackson all recognized explicitly, 
employees will only come forward with this inside information if they are 
protected from retaliation.320 Third, as Jackson, Burlington Northern, and 
Crawford made clear, effective law enforcement requires employees to 
report illegal conduct.321  
This explanation explains these five recent statutory cases better than 
focusing solely on an argument that retaliation is another form of 
discrimination.322 Granted, language in the implied retaliation cases 
supports this position, particularly in Jackson in which the majority makes 
this “retaliation equals discrimination” argument explicitly.323 However, 
this rationale does not explain Congress’ frequent practice of providing 
separate protection from retaliation in anti-discrimination laws.324 Nor 
does it provide insight for interpreting anti-retaliation provisions in laws 
addressing problems other than discrimination.325 Perhaps another way to 
say the same thing (but in not as limited a fashion) is to assert that a law 
preventing discrimination must, by definition, also prevent retaliation for 
reporting discrimination. In other words, for a law to be enforced, 
retaliation against those who report violations of it must be prevented. 
Framed in this manner, retaliation law is not limited by its association 
with discrimination; rather, discrimination law is merely one area in 
which anti-retaliation protection is needed in order to enforce the law. 
Viewed from this perspective, Jackson, CBOCS West, and Gomez-Perez do 
not mean that the Court will imply retaliation protection only in 
discrimination cases. Instead, they could mean that discrimination claims 
present only one example of the types of claims that also need anti-
retaliation protection in order to be enforced effectively. Of course, the 
                                                 
319 See CBOCS West, 128 S. Ct. at 1954; Jackson, 544 U.S. at 181. Moreover, a third employee, 
Crawford, was a victim of discrimination but reported the discrimination during her employer’s 
investigation of her supervisor’s actions more generally. See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 849. 
320 See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 852; Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 67; Jackson, 544 U.S. at 180-81. 
321 See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 852; Jackson, 544 U.S. at 180-81; Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68. 
322 Cf. Brake, supra note 7, at 21-22. 
323 See Jackson, 544 U.S. at 174; cf. CBOCS West, 128 S. Ct. at 1960-61 (rejecting the dissent’s 
argument that retaliation and discrimination are distinct); Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1937 (noting 
that argument that retaliation and discrimination are conceptually different “did not prevail” in 
Jackson). 
324 See Equal Employment Opportunity Act (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); Americans With 
Disability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d). 
325 See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 
1970, 29 U.S.C. § 660. 
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Court’s further focus on retaliation in the Title VII discrimination context 
merely provides another example of a law in which retaliation protection 
is needed in order for the law to be enforced. In those cases, however, the 
protection was explicit rather than implicit, and the issues involved how 
broadly to read that protection.  
Moreover, in the context of the Court’s other retaliation jurisprudence, 
the Court’s recent statements related to the broader Anti-Retaliation 
Principle become meaningful. Over the course of the last fifty years, the 
Court has made these same types of statements in cases involving a 
variety of topics in addition to discrimination. As noted above, the Court 
utilized the Principle by upholding broad retaliation protection in cases 
involving the First Amendment,326 wage claims,327 labor relations,328 
environmental regulations,329 transportation industry rules,330 and witness 
testimony.331 The Court’s protection of whistleblowers goes well beyond 
those who report only discrimination. In each of those instances, the 
Court’s rationale relates to the importance of these employees’ reports for 
law enforcement efforts more generally. 
In seeming juxtaposition to the approach the Court took in the 
statutory cases, the result in the lone First Amendment decision 
substantially narrowed retaliation protection. Indeed, the Court’s 2006 
decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos332 provided the first example of the Court 
denying First Amendment protection to an employee who complained 
about arguably illegal conduct.333 As noted above, although the 
employee’s speech (the complaint about illegal behavior) related to a 
“matter of public concern” (illegal conduct), the Court held that the First 
Amendment did not protect the employee from retaliation because the 
speech was part of the employee’s job duties.334  
To a limited degree, however, Garcetti provides yet another example of 
the Court explaining anti-retaliation protection through the lens of the 
Anti-Retaliation Principle. At the same time that the Court implemented a 
rule that undermined the Principle, the Garcetti Court also made explicit 
statements in support of the Principle. For example, the Court identified 
                                                 
326 See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Township High School Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 572 
(1968). 
327 See Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292-93 (1960). 
328 See NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 122 (1972); Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 
U.S. 731, 744 (1983); Sure-Tan v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 895-96 (1984). 
329 See English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 90 (1990). 
330 See Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 248 (1994); Brock v. Roadway Express, 
Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 258-59 (1987). 
331 See Haddle v. Garrison, 525 U.S. 121, 125 (1998). 
332 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
333 The employee in Garcetti reported “government misconduct” that included alleged perjury 
in the form of an affidavit the employee believed to contain “serious misrepresentations.” See id. at 
414-16. 
334 See id. at 421-23. 
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the importance of balancing the employee and employer interests with the 
“public's interest in receiving the well-informed views of government 
employees engaging in civic discussion.”335 
That said, the Court seems to have strayed from the Anti-Retaliation 
Principle in this case because, despite giving lip service to consideration of 
society’s interest in employee speech,336 it weighed heavily the employer’s 
need for managerial control over its workforce and provided no actual 
discussion of the weight to be given to society’s specific interest in law 
enforcement.337 The Anti-Retaliation Principle normally would call for the 
protection of an employee who reports illegal conduct, even if that 
reporting was part of the employee’s job duties. Job duties would make no 
doctrinal difference if the Court truly focused on the Anti-Retaliation 
Principle in the decision. A rule more consistent with the Principle 
articulated in the rest of the Court’s retaliation jurisprudence would 
recognize that speech related to illegal government conduct lies at the 
heart of First Amendment protection. Society’s interest in knowing about 
the government’s unlawful behavior should be weighed heavily in favor 
of protection from retaliation, particularly because, like the other contexts 
discussed above, government employees have unique access to 
information about illegalities.  
In his dissent in Garcetti, Justice Souter set out a rule that more 
appropriately incorporates the Anti-Retaliation Principle into the Court’s 
Pickering balancing. Justice Souter argued that “private and public 
interests in addressing official wrongdoing and threats to health and 
safety can outweigh the government [employer’s] stake in effective 
implementation of policy.”338 When employee speech relates to job duties, 
typically the government’s need for managerial authority would outweigh 
the First Amendment interests at stake.339 However, according to Justice 
Souter, when the employee “speaks on a matter of unusual importance 
and satisfies high standards of responsibility in the way he does it,” the 
employee should be protected.340 Justice Souter defined “a matter of 
                                                 
335 Id. at 419; see also id. at 419-20 (stating that its decisions “have sought both to promote the 
individual and societal interests that are served when employees speak as citizens on matters of 
public concern and to respect the needs of government employers attempting to perform their 
important public functions”) (citations omitted) (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572-73); cf. San Diego 
v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (per curiam) (“Were [public employees] not able to speak on [the 
operation of their employers], the community would be deprived of informed opinions on 
important public issues. The interest at stake is as much the public's interest in receiving informed 
opinion as it is the employee's own right to disseminate it” (citation omitted)); United States v. 
Treasury Employees, 513 U.S., 454, 470 (1995) (“The large-scale disincentive to Government 
employees' expression also imposes a significant burden on the public's right to read and hear 
what the employees would otherwise have written and said”)). 
336 See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 419-20. 
337 See id. at 422-23. 
338 Id. at 428 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
339 Id. at 435. 
340 Id. 
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unusual importance” to include speech related to “official dishonesty, 
deliberately unconstitutional action, other serious wrongdoing, or threats 
to health and safety.”341 His examples of such speech relate to reports of 
illegal conduct, including when “a public auditor speaks on his discovery 
of embezzlement of public funds, when a building inspector makes an 
obligatory report of an attempt to bribe him, or when a law enforcement 
officer expressly balks at a superior's order to violate constitutional rights 
he is sworn to protect.”342 In other words, Justice Souter agreed with the 
job duty rule generally, but understood it should be limited because of the 
Anti-Retaliation Principle’s protection of speech related to law 
enforcement, even if the speech was part of one’s job duty. Justice Souter’s 
exception for employee reports of illegal government behavior would 
better comply with the Court’s long history of support for the Anti-
Retaliation Principle. 
Importantly, Garcetti ultimately confirms the Court’s belief that the 
Anti-Retaliation Principle should be implemented by Congress, not by the 
Court through constitutional interpretation. One of the reasons the Court 
offered to support its Garcetti holding was that there existed a “powerful 
network of legislative enactments-such as whistle-blower protection laws 
and labor codes-available to those who seek to expose wrongdoing.”343 
Indeed, the Court has used a similar justification for reduced First 
Amendment protection in the employment setting. In Waters v. 
Churchill,344 the Court noted that legislatures could create stronger anti-
retaliation protections “beyond what is mandated by the First 
Amendment, out of respect for the values underlying the First 
Amendment, values central to our social order as well as our legal 
system.”345 Also, in Bush v. Lucas,346 the Court specifically denied a First 
Amendment damages claim to federal employees because Congress had 
created statutory protections from retaliation under the Civil Service 
Reform Act.347 Thus, the constitutional cases linguistically support the 
Anti-Retaliation Principle, but also they often demonstrate the Court’s 
understanding that it is primarily a statutory, not a constitutional, 
principle. 
In sum, all the recent retaliation cases demonstrate that the Supreme 
Court’s retaliation jurisprudence is about law enforcement. Employees 
must be protected from retaliation so that they will report illegal conduct. 
                                                 
341 Id. 
342 Id. at 434. 
343 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425. 
344 511 U.S. 661 (1994). 
345 Id. at 674 (1994). 
346 462 U.S. 367 (1983). 
347 See id. at 389 (“In the past [Congress] has demonstrated its awareness that lower-level 
government employees are a valuable source of information, and that supervisors might 
improperly attempt to curtail their subordinates' freedom of expression.”) 
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These employee reports will themselves aid law enforcement by alerting 
authorities to wrongdoing. As important, the threat of possible employee 
reports will deter violations of the law in the first place. That being said, 
the Garcetti opinion seems to confirm the Court’s long-standing view that 
this anti-retaliation protection more appropriately arises out of statutory, 
rather than constitutional, law.  
III.  The Future 
Identifying and explaining the Supreme Court’s rationale in retaliation 
cases should impact how the Supreme Court and lower courts approach 
retaliation law in the future. 
A. The Supreme Court 
First, and most immediately, the Supreme Court appears interested in 
continuing its recent examination of retaliation law. The Court recently 
granted certiorari in two more statutory retaliation cases: Kasten v. Saint-
Gobain Performance Plastic Corp.348 and Thompson v. North American 
Stainless, LP.349 The Anti-Retaliation Principle could directly influence the 
outcome of these important cases.  
Kasten involves the question of whether the Fair Labor Standard Act’s 
anti-retaliation provision protects an employee who files an oral 
complaint that an employer violated the FLSA.350 In the lower courts, the 
issue turned on how to interpret the FLSA’s protection of an employee 
who “has filed any complaint.”351 Both the District Court and the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals found that this statutory language protects only 
a written complaint, not an oral complaint.352 However, decisions by 
several other circuit courts have protected employees who made oral 
complaints about FLSA violations.353  
Thompson examines whether Title VII prohibits retaliation against an 
employee by “inflicting reprisals” on a third-party who is closely related 
to the employee.354 In this case, the plaintiff alleges that he was fired 
                                                 
348 130 S. Ct. 1890, No. 09-834 (March 22, 2010) (granting petition for writ of certiorari). 
349 130 S. Ct. 3542, No. 09-291 (June 29, 2010) (granting petition for writ of certiorari). 
350 See Pet. for Writ of Certiorari at i, Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastic Corp., No. 09-
834, 2010 WL 146471 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2010). 
351 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3); see also Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 
834, 837-40 (7th Cir. 2009); Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 619 F. Supp.2d 608, 
611-12 (W.D. Wis. 2008). 
352 See Kasten, 570 F.3d at 840; Kasten, 619 F. Supp.2d at 613. 
353 See, e.g., EEOC v. Romeo Community Schools, 976 F.2d 985, 989-90 (6th Cir. 1992); EEOC v. 
White & Son Enters., 881 F.2d 1006, 1011 (11th Cir. 1989); Brock v. Richardson, 812 F.2d 121, 125 (8th 
Cir. 1987). 
354 Pet. for Writ of Certiorari at i, Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, No. 09-291, 2009 WL 
2876195 (U.S. Sept. 3, 2009).  
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because his fiancé engaged in conduct protected by Title VII’s anti-
retaliation provision.355 The District Court for the Eastern District of 
Kentucky entered summary judgment in favor of the employer, 
concluding that Title VII “does not permit third-party claims.”356 A Sixth 
Circuit panel reversed the District Court,357 but then a divided en banc 
Circuit over-turned the panel’s decision.358 The majority pointed out that 
Title VII’s retaliation provision prohibits discrimination against an 
employee “because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful 
employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, 
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, 
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.”359 Relying on what it 
viewed to be the “plain and unambiguous statutory text” of Title VII’s 
retaliation provision, the court found that Title VII protects only 
individuals who themselves engaged in protected conduct.360 Because 
Thompson did not engage in the protected conduct himself, he could not 
bring a retaliation claim based on his own discharge.361 
At first glance, both cases present relatively pedestrian statutory 
interpretation issues. In Kasten, the Court must decide between competing 
interpretations of the statutory terms “file” and “complaint.” In their 
briefs, the two sides each offered several examples of various dictionary 
definitions of the terms to support their arguments.362 Moreover, each side 
presented the Court with language from numerous other statutes that lead 
to one conclusion or the other about the scope of the provision’s 
protection.363  
Similarly, Thompson ostensibly presents two competing interpretative 
views of Title VII’s language. As the Sixth Circuit and other circuits have 
found, the Title VII’s retaliation provision focuses on discrimination 
against the person (“he”) who has opposed unlawful activity or 
                                                 
355 See id. at 3 (alleging that Plaintiff’s fiancé filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission). 
356 Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 435 F. Supp.2d 633, 639 (E.D. Ky. 2006). 
357 See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 520 F.3d 644, 650 (6th Cir. 2008), vacated by Thompson 
v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, No. 07-5040, 2008 WL 6191996 (6th Cir. July 28, 2008). 
358 See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 567 F.3d 804, 816 (6th Cir. 2009). Nine judges joined 
in the majority opinion, one judge delivered a separate concurrence, and six judges filed a total of 
three dissenting opinions. See id.; id. at 816 (Rogers, J., concurring); id. at 818 (Martin, J., dissenting); 
id. at 820 (Moore, J., dissenting); id. at 826 (White, J., dissenting). 
359 See Thompson, 567 F.3d at 807 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (emphasis added)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
360 Id. at 805. 
361 See id. at 807-08. 
362 Petitioner’s Brief, at 22 & 22 n.10; 22 n.11, Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics 
Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010) (No. 09-834); Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 6, 
Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010) (No. 09-834). 
363 Petitioner’s Brief, at 24-30, Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 130 S. Ct. 
1890 (2010) (No. 09-834); Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 6, Kasten v. Saint-
Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., at 8-9, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010) (No. 09-834). 
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participated in Title VII activities.364 However, another interpretation of 
Title VII’s “plain language” could led to a dramatically different result. In 
her dissenting opinion in Thompson, Judge White noted that the anti-
retaliation provision merely describes an “unlawful employment 
practice.”365 It does not identify who receives protection from such 
practices.366 Instead, Title VII answers that second question in a different 
section, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), which provides that any person who claims 
to be “aggrieved” by an employer’s unlawful employment practice can 
file a claim with the EEOC.367 Additionally, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) 
permits lawsuits to be filed “by the person claiming to be aggrieved.”368 
Thus, under White’s analysis of the statutory text, North American 
Stainless committed an unlawful employment practice by retaliating 
against Thompson’s fiancé through its firing of Thompson.369 Because 
Thompson was “aggrieved” by this act, §2000e-5 permits Thompson to file 
a claim against North American Stainless.370 In his Supreme Court 
briefing, Thompson has adopted this statutory argument as his primary 
rationale for overturning the Sixth Circuit’s decision.371 
                                                 
364 See Thompson, 567 F.3d at 807-08; Fogelman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 568 (3d Cir. 
2002) (analyzing similar language in the ADA  and ADEA, and concluding that “[r]ead literally, the 
statutes are unambiguous-indeed, it is hard to imagine a clearer way of specifying that the 
individual who was discriminated against must also be the individual who engaged in protected 
activity”); Smith v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 151 F.3d 813, 819 (8th Cir. 1998) (looking to “plain 
language” of Title VII to resolve issue); Holt v. JTM Indus., 89 F.3d 1224, 1226 (5th Cir. 1996) 
(examining the “plain language” of the ADEA). 
365 See Thompson, 567 F.3d at 827 (White, J., dissenting) (examining 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 and § 
2000e-5(b)).  
366 See id.  
367 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b); Thompson, 567 F.3d at 827. Interestingly, Judge Rogers’ 
concurrence reached a similar conclusion about the relationship between § 2000e-3 and § 2000e-
5(b), except Rogers interpreted § 2000e-5(b) to permit only “persons who are the intended 
beneficiaries” of Title VII to bring claims, which he stated would not include third-parties. Id. at 817 
(Rogers, J., concurring). 
368 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). 
369 See Thompson, 567 F.3d at 828 (White, J., dissenting). 
370 See id. 
371 See Petitioner’s Brief, at 7-9, Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, No. 09-291, 2010 WL 
3501186 (U.S. Sept. 3, 2010). Interestingly, the courts that have upheld third-party claims prior to 
Thompson typically have ignored this statutory argument and relied on an analysis of the broad 
purpose of anti-retaliation provisions. See, e.g., McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 262 (7th Cir. 
1996) (“[A] literal interpretation [of the Title VII § 704(a)] would leave a gaping hole in the 
protection.”); Fitzgerald v. Codex Corp., 882 F.2d 586, 589 (1st Cir. 1989) (upholding third-party 
claim under ERISA because a more narrow construction “clashes with the congressional intent of 
protecting . . . the exercise of rights under an ERISA plan”); NLRB v. Advertisers Mfg. Co., 823 F.2d 
1086, 1088-89 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding that the NLRA prohibited retaliation against third-parties 
because otherwise protected employees will not exercise their rights for “feat that if they do the 
company will try to get back at them in any way it can, including firing their relatives”); De 
Medina v. Reinhardt, 444 F. Supp. 573, 580-81 (D.D.C. 1978) (noting that not protecting a third-
party under Title VII would produce “absurd results”); see also John J. Feeney, An Inevitable 
Progression in the Scope of Title VII’s Anti-retaliation Provision: Third-Party Retaliation Claims, 38 CAP. 
U. L. REV. 643, 655 (2010). 
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In short, as with the other recent retaliation cases, both Kasten and 
Thompson will require the Court to choose between strong linguistic and 
statutory interpretation arguments on either side.372 Despite the claims of 
judges and advocates on either side of these debates, the “plain language” 
of the FLSA and Title VII simply do not answer the questions these cases 
present. Ultimately, then, the Anti-Retaliation Principle may tip the 
balance, as it did in Jackson, Burlington Northern, CBOCS West, Gomez-Perez, 
and Crawford, in which similarly strong interpretative arguments could be 
made regarding the applicability of retaliation protection. As in those 
cases, older retaliation precedent examining the purpose of anti-retaliation 
protections should loom large.  
With regard to Kasten, fifty years ago, the Supreme Court stated that, 
consistent with the Anti-Retaliation Principle, the purpose of the FLSA 
anti-retaliation provision was to encourage employees to report violations 
of the law:  
 
For weighty practical and other reasons, Congress did not 
seek to secure compliance with prescribed standards 
through continuing detailed federal supervision or 
inspection of payrolls. Rather it chose to rely on information 
and complaints received from employees seeking to 
vindicate rights claimed to have been denied. . . . By the 
proscription of retaliatory acts . . . Congress sought to foster 
a climate in which compliance with the substantive 
provisions of the Act would be enhanced.”373 
 
Enforcement of the law relies upon employees to report FLSA violations, 
which requires broad anti-retaliation protection.374 Moreover, in NLRB v. 
Scrivener,375 decided almost forty years ago, the Court relied upon the 
Principle to interpret a similar provision of the National Labor Relations 
Act to protect employees who gave informal statements to an investigator, 
even though the NLRA’s plain language seemed to limit protection to an 
employee who “has filed charges or given testimony.”376 The Scrivener 
Court decided to do exactly what the employee in Kasten asks the Court to 
do now: understand the importance of protecting employees during all 
phases of the enforcement process, including the initial report of illegality, 
and therefore look beyond the statute’s plain, but limited, language.377 
                                                 
372 See discussion supra Part II.A. 
373 Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960). 
374 See id. 
375 405 U.S. 117 (1972). 
376 See id. at 121 (interpreting 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4)).  
377 See id. at 124. 
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Additionally, failing to protect oral complaints could significantly 
impact the effectiveness of a decade-long attempt to encourage employees 
to report illegal conduct through the use of employee hotlines.378 This 
recent trend involves employers providing employees a consistent way to 
make internal complaints about illegal behavior.379 As two prominent 
academics have noted, “if internal disclosures are not protected, reporting 
of wrongdoing would be reduced as unaddressed retaliation deters 
potential whistleblowers and leads to the laws not being as effectively 
enforced.”380 Indeed, protecting oral internal reports makes sense if the 
goal is to increase reporting. Social science studies, for example, suggest 
that most reports of wrongdoing begin as internal reports.381 The Supreme 
Court has been protective of internal reports as well. In addition to 
Crawford, which focused on the issue,382 the Court has noted in the 
constitutional context that the First Amendment will protect internal 
reports as well as external whistleblowing.383 In fact, federal courts and 
the Secretary of Labor have interpreted other statutes to protect internal 
whistleblowers, even when the statute’s language appears to protect only 
external whistleblowers.384  
More specifically, providing methods to orally report wrongdoing has 
become part of the law enforcement landscape that encourages internal 
reporting of wrongdoing.385 Congress and administrative agencies have 
required companies to provide employees a means to report illegal 
conduct.386 Indeed, most companies, spurred by these laws and court 
rulings, provide telephone hotlines for employees to orally report a broad 
range of wrongdoing, including both illegal and unethical conduct.387 
Thus, it no longer makes sense (if it ever did) to think only about 
protecting the formal initiation of a complaint directly with a law 
                                                 
378 See Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model to Encourage Corporate 
Whistleblowers, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1107, 1138-41. 
379 See id.; Terry Morehead Dworkin & Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Internal Whistleblowing: 
Protecting the Interests of the Employee, the Organization, and Society, 29 AM. BUS. L.J. 267, 281 (1991) 
(noting that courts protect internal whistleblowers because “employees who uncover potential 
health and safety problems are likely first to call these to the attention of management.”). 
380 Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 379, at 281. 
381 See id. at 299; Moberly, supra note 378, at 1142. 
382 See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 849. 
383 See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 420 (“Employees in some cases may receive First Amendment 
protection for expressions made at work.”); Givhan v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 429 U.S. 410, 
414 (1979) (protecting employee who complained to supervisor about discrimination). 
384 See, e.g., Passaic Valley Sewerage Commissioners v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 992 F.2d 474, 478-
479 (3rd Cir. 1993) (interpreting the Clean Water Act’s protection of employees who participate in a 
“proceeding” to protect employees who make internal complaints to their corporate employer); 
KOHN, supra note 26, at 251 (noting that the Secretary of Labor “adheres to its longstanding doctrine 
that internal whistleblowing is fully protected” in environmental and nuclear whistleblowers 
cases). 
385 See Moberly, supra note 378, at 1138-41, 1151. 
386 See Moberly, supra note 133, at 988-95. 
387 See id. 
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enforcement agency. In fact, the Seventh Circuit itself recognized this 
reality in Kasten by noting that, despite the FLSA’s language, written 
complaints to an employer (as opposed to just to the government) would 
be protected conduct.388 The circuit court did not draw a distinction 
between internal and external complaints; rather, the court distinguished 
between written and oral complaints to an employer. 
However, the Supreme Court has never been interested in such 
nuanced and nitpicky distinctions when evaluating anti-retaliation 
provisions, particularly in older retaliation statutes, because such 
distinctions undermine enforcement of the law.389 Given the increased 
importance of internal reporting, and the encouragement of oral internal 
reporting through the pervasive use of employee hotlines, failing in Kasten 
to protect employees who make oral reports of wrongdoing would 
severely hamper FLSA law enforcement efforts. The FLSA, in particular, 
relies upon employee reports for its enforcement,390 and an employee can 
play an essential part in the Act’s enforcement through oral as well as 
written action.391 For example, the Department of Labor advertises a 
phone number for employees to call with concerns about FLSA violations, 
explicitly encouraging oral reports and complaints.392  
The Sixth Circuit’s cramped reading of Title VII in Thompson also will 
undermine law enforcement (and thus the Supreme Court’s Anti-
Retaliation Principle). During the past half-century, the Court consistently 
has permitted a wide range of plaintiffs to bring retaliation lawsuits 
because the Court recognized the devastating deterrent effect retaliation 
can have on a person’s willingness to report illegal conduct. Most 
                                                 
388 See Kasten, 570 F.3d at 837-38. 
389 As the Court noted in Scrivener: 
An employee who participates in a Board investigation may not be called 
formally to testify or may be discharged before any hearing at which he could 
testify. His contribution might be merely cumulative or the case may be settled 
or dismissed before hearing. Which employees receive statutory protection 
should not turn on the vagaries of the selection process or on other events that 
have no relation to the need for protection. It would make less than complete 
sense to protect the employee because he participates in the formal inception of 
the process (by filing a charge) or in the final, formal presentation, but not to 
protect his participation in the important developmental stages that fall between 
these two points in time. This would be unequal and inconsistent protection and 
is not the protection needed to preserve the integrity of the Board process in its 
entirety. 
Scrivener, 405 U.S. at 123-24; see also Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 851 (broadly construing the opposition 
clause of Title VII to include participating in an internal investigation). 
390 See Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 292. 
391 Kasten, 585 F.3d 310, 317 (7th Cir. 2009) (Rovner, J., dissenting) (“Oral inquiries, protests, and 
information supplied to an agency representative play no less an important role in the statutory 
scheme than do letters, e-mails, and sworn statements. They must be protected as well.”). 
392 The Wage and Hour Division call center phone number is displayed at 
http://www.dol.gov/whd/contact_us.htm and on posters that the law requires to be displayed in 
workplaces. See Dep't of Labor Wage and Hour Division, FLSA Minimum Wage Poster, http:// 
www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/posters/flsa.htm. 
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obviously, as noted above,393 the Supreme Court in Robinson v. Shell Oil394 
relied on the purpose of Title VII’s retaliation provision to conclude that 
the statute protected former employees as well as current employees.395 
Without this protection, the Supreme Court recognized that victims of 
discrimination would be deterred from complaining to the EEOC.396 In 
fact, many retaliation statutes contain vague language about the scope of 
the individuals they protect, and the Court has interpreted them to enable 
a broad range of individuals to bring retaliation claims, including third 
parties who report statutory violations,397 at-will employees,398 elected 
union officials against their union,399 and illegal aliens.400 In each instance, 
the Court’s holding demonstrated its understanding that enforcing these 
laws depended upon providing anti-retaliation protection to a broad 
range of individuals. 
It is not a far leap from protecting individuals who might report 
misconduct to protecting the relatives and friends of those who report. 
Indeed, courts seem to understand that an effective way to chill reporting 
would be for employers to retaliate against people close to those 
reporting. As noted by the Seventh Circuit—and often repeated by 
others401—“[t]o retaliate against a man by hurting a member of his family 
is an ancient method of revenge, and is not unknown in the field of labor 
relations.”402 Even courts that ultimately dismiss third-party claims based 
on Title VII’s “plain language” have accepted this reality. For example, 
after rejecting a third-party ADEA claim, the Third Circuit noted that 
  
[t]he anti-retaliation provisions recognize that enforcement 
of anti-discrimination laws depends in large part on 
employees to initiate administrative and judicial 
                                                 
393 See supra text accompanying notes 44-49. 
394 519 U.S. 337 (1997). 
395 See id. at 345-46 (noting “a primary purpose of anti-retaliation provisions” is “[m]aintaining 
unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms”).  
396 See id. at 346. 
397 See Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 237 (1969) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 
1982). 
398 See Haddle v. Garrison, 525 U.S. 121, 125 (1998) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2), which 
prevents “intimidation or retaliation against witnesses in federal-court proceedings,” includes 
protection for at-will employees). 
399 See Sheet Metal Workers’ Intern’l v. Lynn, 488 U.S. 347, 355 (1989) (interpreting Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 412). 
400 See Sure-Tan v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 895-96 (1984) (holding that reporting undocumented 
aliens employees to law enforcement authorities was an unfair labor practice under the National 
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1) & (3), when done in retaliation for participating in union 
activities). 
401 See, e.g., Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 568-69 (3d Cir. 2002); Kenrich 
Petrochemicals, Inc. v. NLRB, 907 F.2d 400, 410 (3d Cir. 1990); Alex B. Long, The Troublemaker’s 
Friend: Retaliation Against Third Parties and the Right of Association in the Workplace, 59 FLA. L. REV. 
931, 932 (2007). 
402 NLRB v. Advertisers Mfg. Co., 823 F.2d 1086, 1088 (7th Cir. 1987). 
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proceedings. There can be no doubt that an employer who 
retaliates against the friends and relatives of employees who 
initiate anti-discrimination proceedings will deter employees 
from exercising their protected rights. . . . Allowing 
employers to retaliate via friends and family, therefore, 
would appear to be in significant tension with the overall 
purpose of the anti-retaliation provisions, which are 
intended to promote the reporting, investigation, and 
correction of discriminatory conduct in the workplace.403  
 
Protecting third-party victims of retaliation would follow easily from the 
Court’s Anti-Retaliation Principle, particularly as the Court applied the 
Principle in Burlington Northern and in Robinson. The Supreme Court 
already recognized in Burlington Northern that retaliation can take many 
forms, and thus that the law should prohibit a wide range of retaliatory 
activity.404 Moreover, Robinson recognized that Title VII’s anti-retaliation 
provision must protect people other than “employees” in order to be 
effective.405  
Kasten and Thompson will give the Court further opportunities to apply 
the Anti-Retaliation Principle and to enhance employee law enforcement 
efforts. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s decisions in these cases could have 
broad implications because several federal laws contain anti-retaliation 
provisions with similar language to the FLSA and Title VII.406 If the 
Supreme Court continues its historic and recent reliance on the Anti-
Retaliation Principle, then it should reverse the lower courts’ limited 
views of retaliation protection because their decisions weaken law 
enforcement efforts.  
B. Lower Courts 
The Anti-Retaliation Principle can serve a second important role, 
directed at lower courts. The Principle’s emphasis on law enforcement 
provides lower courts the proper perspective from which to evaluate 
                                                 
403 Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 569. But see Smith v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 151 F.3d 813, 819 (8th Cir. 
1998) (finding that protecting third-parties who did not engage in protected activity is not 
necessary to advance goals of anti-retaliation provision). 
404 See Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 57. 
405 See Robinson,  
406 For statutes with language similar to the FLSA language at issue in Kasten, see Federal 
Sector Labor Management Relations Program, 5 U.S.C. § 7116(a)(4); Foreign Service Labor-
Management Relations, 22 U.S.C. § 4115(a)(4); Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 
660(c)(1); Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1855(a); Employee 
Polygraph Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2002(4)(A); Workforce Investment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2934(f); 
Railway Labor Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20109(a)(3); Surface Transportation Assistance Act, 49 U.S.C. § 
31105(a)(1)(A)(i). For statutes with language similar to the Title VII language at issue in Thompson, 
see Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1140; Americans With Disabilities Act, 
42 U.S.C. § 12203(b); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d). 
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retaliation cases. Rather than view retaliation cases as a one-on-one battle 
of an employee versus an employer, the Principle invites and requires 
consideration of society’s broader interest in law enforcement. The 
Principle also explicitly recognizes the role that employees can play in 
providing information that enhances the enforcement of society’s laws. 
Thus, when courts examine an employee’s retaliation claim, they 
should consider explicitly whether protecting the employee from 
retaliation would encourage other employees to come forward with 
information about illegal conduct, and whether that information actually 
would help law enforcement efforts. This perspective might affect several 
different areas of retaliation law that courts currently debate when 
examining statutory anti-retaliation provisions as well as the common law 
of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. I will address two such 
areas in this section. 
Causation. First, in recent years, courts increasingly have scrutinized 
the level of causation required for a plaintiff to prove that an employer’s 
retaliation was caused by an employee’s protected conduct. The typical 
retaliation case requires the plaintiff to prove three primary elements: (1) 
protected conduct; (2) an adverse action; and (3) that the protected 
conduct caused the adverse action.407 As explained below, “but for” 
causation could be required, or perhaps some lower standard is 
applicable, such as requiring that protected conduct be a “motivating” or 
“substantial” factor in the adverse employment action. 
As a result of this ambiguity, courts have examined and disagreed 
about the level of causation required in retaliation cases.408 Many older 
anti-retaliation provisions express this causation standard by prohibiting 
retaliation “because of” various protected conduct.409 Although one 
reading of this language would suggest that “but for” causation is 
required, a 1977 Supreme Court decision, Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. 
Educ. v. Doyle,410 stated that the proper standard in a First Amendment 
retaliation case was whether the protected conduct was a “motivating” or 
“substantial” factor in the employer’s decision to take an adverse 
                                                 
407 See WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 118, at 230; Rosenthal, supra note 67, at 1133 (Title VII). 
Other elements are sometimes included, such as employer knowledge of protected activity. See 
WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 118, at 230. 
408 Compare Smith v. Xerox Corp., 602 F.3d 320, 334 (5th Cir. 2010) (using “motivating factor” 
causation standard for Title VII retaliation claim) with Wolf v. Coca-Cola Co., 200 F.3d 1337, 1343 
(11th Cir. 2000) (using “but for” standard for FLSA retaliation claim) and with Gupta v. Florida Bd. 
of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 590 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding that FLSA protected conduct must not be 
“wholly unrelated”); cf. Kodish v. Oakbrook Terrace Fire Protection Dist., 604 F.3d 490, 501 (7th Cir. 
2010) (asserting that the Supreme Court’s Gross opinion “clarified that unless a federal statute 
provides otherwise, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating but-for causation in suits 
brought under federal law”). 
409 See, e.g., Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3; Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 
623(d); Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12203; Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 
215(a)(3); False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h); National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4). 
410 429 U.S. 274 (1977). 
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employment action—a lower standard of proof for the employee than 
“but for” causation.411 As the Court noted, “[a] borderline or marginal 
candidate should not have the employment question resolved against him 
because of constitutionally protected conduct.”412 
Although Mt. Healthy was a constitutional case, the Supreme Court has 
examined causation language in employment statutes as well. In Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins,413 a majority of the Court held that Title VII mixed-
motive discrimination cases required the plaintiff to prove only that an 
employee’s protected status was a motivating factor in the employer’s 
decision.414 In other words, the Court interpreted the “because of” 
language in Title VII to mean “was a motivating factor in.” After the 
plaintiff satisfied this “motivating factor” burden, the burden of 
persuasion shifted to the defendant to demonstrate that the employer 
would have taken the same adverse employment action even if it had not 
considered the prohibited factor (such as race or gender)415 – a similar 
affirmative defense to the one set forth in Mt. Healthy for First 
Amendment retaliation cases.416 Satisfying this burden provided the 
employer a complete affirmative defense to the employee’s discrimination 
claim.417 In the 1991 Civil Rights Act, Congress enshrined this mixed-
motive analysis, and its accompanying “motivating factor” causation 
standard, in Title VII’s statutory language regarding discrimination.418 
Subsequently, Congress lowered even further the employee’s causation 
burden in whistleblower anti-retaliation provisions passed in the last 
decade by adopting a “contributing factor” standard,419 indicating a 
substantial Congressional preference for this lower burden of proof.  
                                                 
411 See id. at 287. 
412 Id. at 286. The Court also held that the employer should have an affirmative defense if the 
employer would have reached the same employment decision in the absence of the protected 
conduct. See id. at 287. 
413 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
414 A “mixed motive” discrimination case involves an allegation that an employer took an 
adverse employment action against an employee because of both permissible and impermissible 
considerations. See id. at 232, 244-247. Although Price Waterhouse did not result in a single majority 
opinion, six justices agreed that the “motivating” or “substantial” factor standard was the proper 
standard. See id. at 258 (plurality opinion); id. at 259-60 (opinion of White, J.); id. at 276 (opinion of 
O’Connor, J.). See also Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2347 (2009) 
(reiterating the holdings of the various opinions in Price Waterhouse). 
415 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258. 
416 See Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287. 
417 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258. 
418 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), Pub. L. 102-166, Title I, § 107(a), 105 Stat. 1075 (Nov. 21, 1991). 
The Act also adopted the affirmative defense set forth in Price Waterhouse, but only permitted the 
defense to relieve the employer of liability for certain damages claims. See § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 
Congress utilized this same language in a provision prohibiting retaliation against employees who 
take leave from employment to serve in the military. See 38 U.S.C. § 4311(c).  
419 A whistleblower must prove that his protected conduct was a “contributing factor” in the 
adverse employment action taken against him. See, e.g., Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and 
Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR-21), 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(B); Pipeline Safety Improvement 
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However, the 1991 Civil Rights Act did not resolve the debate around 
the meaning of “because of” language because it applies only to Title VII’s 
discrimination section (not the anti-retaliation provision). Older anti-
retaliation provisions still utilize the “because of” language, and lower 
courts have struggled with the level of causation required by these older 
anti-retaliation statutes, including Title VII, the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, and the False Claims Act. Some courts, relying on Mt. 
Healthy or Price Waterhouse, interpreted the statutes to adopt implicitly the 
“motivating factor” standard (and also the complete affirmative defense 
for employers set forth in Price Waterhouse).420  
Complicating matters further, in a surprising 2009 decision in Gross v. 
FBL Financial Services, Inc.,421 the Supreme Court held that the “because of” 
language in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) required 
a “but for” standard for its discrimination claims (the Court did not 
address retaliation claims explicitly).422 Despite the fact that the ADEA 
was patterned after Title VII and the two statutes have typically been 
interpreted similarly, the Court’s rationale was that the 1991 Civil Rights 
Act applied the “motivating factor” language only to Title VII’s 
discrimination provision.423 Because Congress did not also amend the 
ADEA with this language, the more traditional “but for” standard should 
apply to the ADEA’s “because of” language.424 In other words, the Court 
seemed to say that a statute’s use of the term “because of” should be 
interpreted to mean “but for” causation.425 
The Gross opinion seemed to close the door to any argument that 
“because of” language could mean “motivating factor” rather than the 
“but for” standard for retaliation claims under Title VII, the ADEA, and 
other older statutes.426 Indeed, some Circuit Courts have interpreted Gross 
to apply “but for” causation to any federal statute that does not explicitly 
utilize some other standard.427 However, in March 2010, the Fifth Circuit 
                                                                                                                                     
Act of 2002, 49 U.S.C. § 60129(b)(2)(B). Other statutes have explicitly adopted AIR-21’s burden of 
proof standard. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(C). 
420 See, e.g., Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1269 (11th Cir. 2001) (assuming the 
Price Waterhouse mixed-motive scheme applies to Title VII retaliation claims); Norbeck v. Basin 
Elec. Power Coop., 215 F.3d 848, 850-51 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding that the Price Waterhouse scheme 
applies to the False Claims Act); Kubicko v. Ogden Logistics Servs., 181 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 1999) 
(Title VII retaliation claim). 
421 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009). 
422 See id. at 2350-51. 
423 Id. at 2349. 
424 See id. 
425 See id. at 2350-51. 
426 See Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3; Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d); 
Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12203; Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3); 
False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h); National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4). 
427 See, e.g., Fairley v. Andrews, 578 F.3d 518, 525-26 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[Gross] holds that, unless a 
statute (such as the Civil Rights Act of 1991) provides otherwise, demonstrating but-for causation is 
part of the plaintiff’s burden in all suits under federal law.”); Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, 
Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 961-62 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Warshaw v. Concentra Health Servs., Civil Action 
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issued an unexpected opinion in Smith v. Xerox Corp.,428 finding that Title 
VII’s retaliation provision permitted a mixed motive theory and its 
accompanying “motivating factor” language from Price Waterhouse.429 The 
employer argued to the Circuit Court that the Gross reasoning should 
apply to Title VII retaliation cases because the 1991 Civil Rights Act did 
not amend the retaliation provision of Title VII to include the “motivating 
factor” language.430 Therefore, according to the employer, Congress must 
have meant to keep the “but for” standard implied by the provisions 
“because of” language.431 However, the court maintained that Gross 
required courts to interpret Title VII and the ADEA differently, and that 
Price Waterhouse should still apply to Title VII retaliation cases.432 Because 
of Price Waterhouse’s application, the court concluded that a Title VII 
retaliation plaintiff could satisfy its burden of proof by demonstrating that 
the plaintiff’s protected conduct was a “motivating factor” in an adverse 
employment action.433 
To the extent Gross can be limited in this manner—to apply only to age 
discrimination claims—lower courts should utilize the Anti-Retaliation 
Principle to interpret retaliation statutes under the “motivating factor” 
standard. Retaliation cases almost always involve difficult decisions 
regarding mixed motives and retaliation, and a “but for” causation 
standard would be devastating to employees who blow the whistle on 
illegal conduct. Whistleblowers often are outspoken employees that can 
be perceived as troublemakers—in large part that makes them 
whistleblowers—and requiring that an employee prove that protected 
conduct is the only factor in a disciplinary action will be enormously 
difficult. Even under statutes that require only a “motivating factor” 
standard (or the lower “contributing factor” standard), some empirical 
                                                                                                                                     
No. 07-1994, ___ F. Supp.2d ____, 2010 WL 2470881, at *14 (E.D. Pa. June 14, 2010) (applying “but 
for” standard to ADA retaliation claim). In light of Gross, the lower courts appear to be re-
considering precedent that automatically applied Title VII’s burden-shifting schemes to other 
employment statutes by closing examining various statute’s language to determine causation. 
Compare Hunter v. Valley View Local Schools, 579 F.3d 688, 691-92 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding that the 
FMLA permitted a “mixed-motive” analysis based on the statute’s use of the term “interfered 
with” and the Department of Labor’s interpretation of that term) with Rasic v. City of Northlake, 
No. 08 C 104, 2009 WL 3150428, at *17 (N.D. Ill. Sept.25, 2009) (finding that the FMLA’s use of “for 
opposing” is not distinguishable from the ADEA’s use of “because of” and finding that “but for” 
causation is appropriate). 
428 602 F.3d 320 (5th Cir. 2010).  
429 See id. at 330. 
430 See id. at 328. 
431 See id.  
432 See id. at 330 (noting that the Supreme Court in Gross concluded that the ADEA and Title 
VII were “materially different with respect to the relevant burden of persuasion” (quoting Gross, 
129 S. Ct. at 2348)).  
433 See id. at 326-30. The Fifth Circuit also overruled its own precedent to find that a Title VII 
plaintiff could satisfy the motivating factor burden with either direct or circumstantial evidence. 
See id. at 331-32; compare with Fierros v. Tex. Dep’t of Health, 274 F.3d 187 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding 
that direct evidence was required for a mixed motive retaliation case). 
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evidence demonstrates that causation is notoriously difficult to prove.434 If 
lower courts take the Court’s Anti-Retaliation Principle seriously, then 
they will look for ways to distinguish Gross and continue to apply the 
“motivating factor” language from the Court’s Price Waterhouse decision in 
retaliation cases. 
Reasonable Belief. The Anti-Retaliation Principle also could influence 
lower courts when they determine whether a whistleblower had a 
“reasonable belief” that the conduct the employee reports is illegal. The 
issue revolves around the “protected conduct” element of most retaliation 
and wrongful discharge claims. This element requires the employee to 
have engaged in specifically protected conduct, which often involves 
reporting or opposing “any practice made . . . unlawful” by the statute 
containing the anti-retaliation provision.435 Courts could interpret this 
language to mean the employee must report actual illegal conduct to be 
protected.436 In other words, if the employer’s actions were legal, the law 
would not protect an employee from retaliation for reporting the conduct 
under the mistaken, but reasonable, belief that the conduct was actually 
illegal.437 Additionally, several common law courts require an employee to 
report actual illegalities in order to state a claim for wrongful discharge in 
violation of public policy.438 
Nevertheless, despite this potentially narrow protected conduct 
requirement, other courts have required employees only to demonstrate a 
“reasonable belief” that employer conduct is illegal.439 The most well-
known example of this standard stems from the Supreme Court’s 2001 
decision in Clark County School District v. Breeden.440 In that case, the Court 
assumed (without deciding) that the reasonable belief standard applied to 
Title VII retaliation cases,441 a decision that paved the way for courts 
uniformly to adopt the reasonable belief standard for a broad range of 
                                                 
434 See Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes-Oxley 
Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 120-28 (2007). 
435 See Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (prohibiting retaliation against an employee who 
“opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter”); ADEA, 29 
U.S.C. § 623(d) (same language); ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (same); FMLA, 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2) 
(same). 
436 Some state courts have interpreted state statutory protection to require a report of actual 
illegality. See WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 118, at 82 (citing Bordell v. General Elec. Co., 667 
N.E.2d 922 (N.Y. 1996) and Obst v. Microtron, Inc., 614 N.W.2d 196 (Minn. 2000)). 
437 Compare Byers v. Dallas Morning News, 209 F.3d 419, 428 (5th Cir. 2000) (using subjective 
and objective test) with EEOC v. C & D. Sportswear Corp., 398 F. Supp. 300, 306 (M.D. Ga. 1975) 
(finding that protected conduct involved only opposition to an actual unlawful employment 
practice); cf. Rosenthal, supra note 67, at 1140-41 (arguing that, in Clark County School District v. 
Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001), “the Court’s language suggested that perhaps it would require an 
actual violation, as the statute’s language requires). 
438 See, e.g., Barker v. State Ins. Fund, 40 P.3d 463 (Okla. 2001). 
439 See Brake, supra note 7, at 79 (citing cases). 
440 532 U.S. 268 (2001). 
441 See id. at 270. 
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statutes.442 This requirement involves both a subjective and objective 
component.443 The employee must subjectively believe the conduct is 
illegal, and the employee’s belief must be objectively reasonable. The 
employee could be wrong about the legality of the employer’s actions, but 
as long as the employee’s belief was reasonable, the law would still 
protect the employee from retaliation. Recently-passed federal laws 
specifically require the employee to have a “reasonable belief” that the 
employer action the employee reports or opposes is illegal.444 
The reasonable belief standard seems to comport with the Anti-
Retaliation Principle, particularly when compared with the potential that 
courts could interpret some statutory language to protect only reports of 
actual violations.445 However, despite this seemingly employee-friendly 
standard, lower courts often have applied the reasonable belief 
requirement to narrow, rather than broaden, retaliation protection.446 In 
many cases, lower courts have turned Breeden’s “reasonable belief” 
standard into an implicit requirement that an employee report actual 
violations of the law.447 These courts have required employees to know 
                                                 
442 See Rosenthal, supra note 67, at 1129 n.7 (stating that all United States Circuit Courts 
adopted the objectively reasonable standard after Breeden) (citing cases). Courts also use the 
reasonable belief standards for other statutes, such as Title IX and Title VI, that do not specify the 
standard to be utilized. See Brake, supra note 7, at 83 (citing cases). 
443 See Rosenthal, supra note 67, at 1134. 
444 See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 806, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A. 
445 Some commentators have reviewed this landscape and suggested that an even more lenient 
standard might better encourage employees to come forward with information of potential 
wrongdoing. For example, Professor Lawrence Rosenthal argues that a “good faith” standard 
would comport with an appropriately broad reading of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision to 
encourage employees to report violations of the statute. See Rosenthal, supra note 67, at 1131. In his 
view, the law should protect employees who make reports about employer illegal conduct in good 
faith, even if the employee is wrong and even if the employee’s belief about the conduct is 
unreasonable. In the case of Title VII, at least, Professor Rosenthal acknowledges that courts likely 
would reject a purely subjective good faith standard given the statutory language and courts’ 
interpretation of the language after Breeden, as well as EEOC interpretations that support a 
“reasonable belief” requirement. See id. at 1130-31; see also Brake, supra note 7, at 81 n.215. More 
broadly, the statutory language of more recently-enacted anti-retaliation provisions explicitly 
utilize the “reasonable belief” standard, which would seem to preclude courts using the good faith 
standard. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 806, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A; American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009, P.L. 111-5, § 1553(b)(1)(B).  
446 See Brake, supra note 7, at 76 (“One of the most problematic limits [of retaliation doctrine] is 
the requirement that the challenger have a reasonable belief that the challenged conduct amounts 
to unlawful discrimination. Through this doctrine, courts have reinforced selective and narrow 
interpretations of discrimination, while labeling broader conceptions as unreasonable.”); Brianne J. 
Gorod, Rejecting Reasonableness, 56 AM. UNIV. L. REV. 1469, 1472-73 (2007) (arguing that courts 
should reject the reasonableness standard and instead hold that “a plaintiff's complaint would be 
protected unless the defendant could establish that the plaintiff was acting in bad faith at the time 
she made the complaint”). 
447 See Moberly, supra note 133, at 1003 & n.161; Rosenthal, supra note 67, at 1162-63 n. 231 
(“[M]any courts . . . do not seem to be taking into account the “limited knowledge” most Title VII 
plaintiffs have about the contours of Title VII, and the courts have consistently ruled against 
employees after concluding that their belief of a Title VII violation was not objectively 
reasonable.”); see id. at 1174-75 (citing Fogelman v. Greater Hazelton Health Alliance, 122 F. App'x 
581, 584 (3rd Cir. 2004) and Amos v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 153 F. App'x 637, 645-46 (11th Cir. 2005)). 
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the subtle intricacies of the substantive law allegedly being violated by 
their employer in order to conclude that an employee had a reasonable 
belief that an illegality occurred.448 For example, in Jordan v. Alternative 
Resources Corp.,449 the Fourth Circuit held that an employee who reported 
a co-employee’s use of a racial slur was not protected from retaliation, 
because no employee could have reasonably thought that a one-time use 
of a racial epitaph violated Title VII.450 However, the Jordan court seemed 
more intent on examining whether the incident could have amounted to 
harassment rather than on whether the employee could have reasonably 
believed that it violated the law.451  
The Anti-Retaliation Principle could affect courts’ thinking about how 
to interpret the reasonable belief standard to incorporate more fully the 
Principle’s law enforcement goals. The Jordan court’s narrow construction 
underestimates the chilling effect of retaliation and fails to consider that 
employees typically do not have legal expertise. Broader construction of 
the “protected activity” requirement might better support society’s 
interest in law enforcement because employees will feel more free to 
report conduct that might violate the law in situations in which a lay 
person would not be sure about the conduct’s illegality. Society would be 
better off with knowledgeable decision makers determining whether 
disclosed conduct violates the law after an employee’s report, instead of 
lay employees trying to determine legality before they report. This broader 
protection should cause a court to be less interested in whether the 
employee’s report precisely identified an explicit violation of law, and 
more interested in the employer’s response to that report. 
Moreover, other Supreme Court retaliation precedent supports a more 
nuanced view of an employee’s background when considering whether 
the employee objectively acted reasonably. In Burlington Northern, the 
Court examined what type of employer action might be deemed 
                                                 
448 See, e.g., George v. Leavitt, 407 F.3d 405, 416 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding that the 
reasonableness of a report of illegality would be judged by whether reasonable juror would find 
the conduct illegal); Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 319-21 (4th Cir. 2003) (failing to protect 
employee who complained about disparate impact under Title VI because the court found such 
practices did not violate Title VI as a matter of law); Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care 
Center, Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 707-08 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding employee was not protected from 
retaliation because he complained about sexual harassment based on his sexual orientation, which 
is not covered by Title VII); Little v. United Techs. Carrier Transicold Div., 103 F.3d 956, 959-61 (11th 
Cir. 1997) (refusing to protect from retaliation an employee who reported a single racially offensive 
comment); Holmes v. Long Island R.R. Co., No. 96 V 6196 (NG), 2001 WL 797951, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. 
June 4, 2001) (dismissing retaliation claim based upon reporting sexual comments because the 
comments were too isolated for the employee to reasonably believe that the comments created a 
hostile environment); see also Brake, supra note 7, at 86-98 (discussing cases). 
449 458 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2007).  
450 See id. at 339-40. Title VII requires “severe and pervasive” harassment, a standard typically 
not met by the single use of offensive language. See id. (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 
17, 21 (1993)). See also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (holding that one 
incident typically cannot create a hostile environment unless the incident is sufficiently severe). 
451 See Jordan, 458 F.3d at 341-43. 
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sufficiently adverse to be “retaliation.”452 As noted above, the Court 
concluded that retaliation occurred if the employer action “could well 
dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of 
discrimination.”453 Later in the opinion, the Court stated that when courts 
consider the “reasonable employee,” courts should take into account the 
specific employee’s individual circumstances: “the significance of any 
given act of retaliation will often depend upon the particular 
circumstances. Context matters.”454  
In the same way, lower courts could fix the problems caused by 
narrow interpretations of the “reasonable belief” standard by explicating 
what the law expects from an employee when reporting misconduct. 
Retaliation law should protect only “reasonable” reports, but that 
standard should consider the education level and expertise of the 
employee making the report, as well as the employee’s own employment 
experiences with the employer.455 In-house counsel may be expected to 
know the intricate details of sexual harassment law, but perhaps a blue-
collar worker with a high school education should not.456 Accountants 
may be expected to understand whether the securities regulations have 
been violated, but should be given leeway when a law’s language can lead 
to different reasonable interpretations.457  
                                                 
452 See Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 57. 
453 Id. 
454 Id. at 69. As Professor Deborah Brake has pointed out, the Ninth Circuit in Breeden adopted 
a similarly nuanced standard that the Supreme Court ignored in its Breeden opinion: 
[T]he Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Breeden exhibited a more appropriate measure of 
caution, emphasizing the need to take into account ‘the limited knowledge 
possessed by most Title VII plaintiffs about the factual and legal bases of their 
claims.’” The Ninth Circuit evaluated reasonableness form the perspective of a 
Title VII plaintiff. The Supreme Court’s cursory discussion of reasonableness 
clouded the question of perspective and implicitly adopted the Court’s own 
perspective, shaped by the limits of existing case law. 
Brake, supra note 7, at 82-83 (citations omitted). 
455 See Reed v. A.W. Lawrence & Co., Inc., 95 F.3d 1170, 1178-79 (2nd Cir. 1996) (specifically 
noting that the employee’s employment context and history, should be considered when 
examining whether the employee reasonably believed she was a victim of harassment and 
therefore engaged in protected conduct when she reported the alleged harassment) Cf. Brake, supra 
note 7, at 103 (suggesting that courts adopt a standard that asks “whether the plaintiff can make a 
reasoned case that the practices opposed interfere with the goals and objectives of discrimination 
law” and arguing that the “perspective from which reasonableness is measured should not be that 
of the judge reading and selecting the dominant legal precedents, but the reasonable employee, 
student, or person in the organization who wishes to further the goals of discrimination law: 
dismantling unjust privilege and promoting the conditions necessary for equal citizenship”). 
456 Compare Nuskey v. Hochberg, 657 f. Supp.2d 47, 61 (D.D.C. 2009) (“If plaintiff relied on an 
EEO training to conclude that Title VII had been violated, her belief was in good faith and was not 
unreasonable-even if her conclusion ultimately proved to be incorrect.”) with Henderson v. Waffle 
House, Inc., 238 Fed. Appx. 499 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding that waitress’s claim of sexual harassment 
based on isolated jokes and comments were not sufficient for objectively reasonable basis for 
retaliation) 
457 Cf. Allen v. Stewart Enterp., No. 06-081, at 14 (ARB July 27, 2006) (finding that a “reasonable 
belief” that a statute has been violated means a high certainty that the law has been broken). In 
Allen, the employee alleged that she examined “internal consolidated financial statements” and 
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Lower courts can best support the Anti-Retaliation Principle by 
recognizing that employees typically are not lawyers and therefore should 
not be required to evaluate numerous legal nuances before reporting 
misconduct. Law enforcement experts and supervisors should be charged 
with determining whether the law is being violated, not employees. The 
law should simply encourage employees to come forward with 
information that a reasonable person with their knowledge and 
educational experience would believe to be a violation of the law. The 
easiest way to encourage that process is to protect a broad range of 
activity and then closely evaluate the employer’s response. In other 
words, the Anti-Retaliation Principle best protects society’s interest when 
the scrutiny in retaliation cases is directed towards the employer’s 
response to whistleblowing, rather than the employee’s actions when 
blowing the whistle. Lower courts would help achieve this result by 
loosening the “reasonable belief” standard to permit the protection of 
more reports of potentially illegal conduct. 
Conclusion 
In Supreme Court retaliation cases, despite the Court’s employer-
friendly outlook and conservative judicial philosophy, it has protected 
employees who act to enforce society’s laws. The lesson from the Court’s 
use of the Anti-Retaliation Principle over the last fifty years and, in 
particular, during the last five years, is that the Court rightly values 
retaliation protection. Protecting employees from retaliation when they 
disclose an employer’s illegal behavior advances society’s goal of strong 
law enforcement. The Supreme Court and lower courts should work to 
further the Anti-Retaliation Principle by strengthening the protections 
available to whistleblowers who report illegal corporate behavior.  
Although this Article has detailed the ways the Anti-Retaliation 
Principle can provide lessons to courts in retaliation cases, Congress could 
learn from the Principle as well. In a subsequent article, I will detail how 
Congress can better utilize employees for law enforcement purposes. For 
example, at a minimum, Congress could update older statutes to explicitly 
provide employees strong anti-retaliation protection, which would relieve 
the Supreme Court of having to perform substantial jurisprudential 
                                                                                                                                     
that these statements indicated that the company violated an SEC rule. See id. The ARB, however, 
found that her disclosure of this potential SEC rule violation was not protected because these 
internal reports did not have to be filed with the SEC, and therefore could not have violated the 
rule. See id. Based on this nuance, the ARB found that the employee could not have “reasonably 
believed” that a violation of the rule occurred. See id.; see also Jason M. Zuckerman, SOX’s 
Whistleblower Provision: Promise Unfulfilled, 4 SECURITIES LIT. REPORTER 14, 16–17 (July/Aug. 2007); cf. 
Gorod, supra note 446, at 1484–96 (criticizing the “reasonable belief” standard because courts may 
use it to improperly reject retaliation claims under the opposition clause of Title VII). 
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gymnastics in order to satisfy the Anti-Retaliation Principle.458 
Furthermore, the Court’s Anti-Retaliation Principle teaches that Congress 
may be a better hope for protecting government employees from 
retaliation than relying upon First Amendment protections. Accordingly, 
Congress could encourage reporting illegal conduct in the government by 
improving the statutory whistleblower protections for federal employees. 
In fact, identifying the Supreme Court’s use of the Anti-Retaliation 
Principle helps focus attention on the fact that the Court itself often 
answers questions that might be answered best by Congress: Which laws 
should be enforced by relying, at least in part, upon employee 
disclosures? Which employees should be protected from retaliation if they 
disclose illegalities? To whom should employees be required to disclose 
misconduct in order to be protected? What type of retaliation should be 
prohibited? In its recent retaliation cases, the Supreme Court had to 
answer these questions because Congress did not. Democratic norms 
suggest that the legislature as well as the courts should broadly 
implement the Anti-Retaliation Principle and balance employer and 
employee interests with society’s interest in law enforcement. Until 
Congress addresses these questions more consistently, however, it 
appears that the Supreme Court is willing to step into the breach to 
protect employees who report illegal conduct. 
                                                 
458 See discussion supra Part II.C. (discussing difficulties of finding implied retaliation 
protection in Title IX, Section 1981, and the federal sector provision of the ADEA). 
